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We develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model
of identity in which people care about ￿who they are￿ and infer their own values from past
choices. The model sheds light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches.
Identity investments respond nonmonotonically to recent acts or threats, and taboos on mere
thoughts arise to protect beliefs about the ￿priceless￿value of certain social assets. High en-
dowments trigger escalating commitment and a treadmill e⁄ect, while competing identities can
cause dysfunctional capital destruction. Social interactions induce both social and antisocial
norms of contribution, sustained by respectively shunning free riders or do-gooders.
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0￿Man naturally desires... not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing
which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of
praise. He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though
it should be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame...￿
￿When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon
it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as
it were, into two persons: and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a di⁄erent character
from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined and judged of.... The ￿rst is the
spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by
placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen
from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly
call myself, an of whose conduct, under the character of the spectator, I was endeavouring
to form some opinion.￿
(Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 151-152)
Introduction
From charitable donations to experimental games, there is by now ample evidence that
people often behave ￿morally￿even in anonymous, one-shot interactions. This has justi￿ably
dispelled an excessively narrow view of economic man, but the standard replacement ￿ human
beings endowed with various forms of ￿social preferences￿ ￿is still a highly unreliable guide for
understanding the vicissitudes of (im)moral behavior. If good deeds stem from altruistic tastes,
why do the same people often seize upon (even actively seek) the most transparent change in
framing, the thinnest of veils to revert to sel￿shness? If punishing cheaters and free-riders re￿ ects
a taste for fairness or reciprocity, why do we also see people turning on those who behave too
well? This ￿￿ ickering￿nature of moral behavior (see Section I for detailed evidence) makes clear
that more is at work than socially enriched utility functions. No such preferences, moreover, can
account for information-averting behaviors, such as people prohibiting themselves from merely
thinking about certain ￿taboo tradeo⁄s￿ .
We develop in this paper a ￿third-generation￿theory of moral behavior, based on a general
model of identity management. The theory is cognitive, in that it explicitly models moral
identity and similar concepts as beliefs about one￿ s deep ￿values￿ and emphasizes the self-
inference process through which they operate. At the same time, the needs served by particular
beliefs are linked to more basic aspects of preferences. This ￿demand side￿ can re￿ ect a quest
for a⁄ective bene￿ts (hedonic value of self-esteem, or anticipatory utility from one￿ s economic
and social assets), functional ones (a strong moral sense of self that helps resist temptations),
or both.1 On the ￿supply side￿ of motivated beliefs, the pivotal role is played by imperfect
1The ￿demand side￿of our framework thus uni￿es models based on a consumption value of beliefs (Akerlof
1memory or awareness, which naturally gives rise to identity investments as self-signals: because
people have better, more objective access to the record of their conduct than to the exact
mix of motivations driving them, they are led to judge themselves by what they do.2 When
contemplating choices, they then take into account what kind of a person each alternative would
￿make them￿and the desirability of those self-views ￿ a form of rational cognitive dissonance
reduction.3
Many puzzling aspects of (im)moral behavior become much easier to understand from a self-
reputational perspective. First, being linked to imperfect self-knowledge, identity-enhancing
behaviors are more likely when objective information about deep preferences is scarce (true
generosity, loyalty or faith) and they are easily a⁄ected by minor manipulations of salience such as
cues, reminders and transparent veils of personal responsibility (see Section I). Most importantly,
investments in one￿ s self-view are hill-shaped with respect to prior con￿dence in being a moral
person. This implies history-dependence in behavior with a distinctive, non-monotonic pattern
of responses to manipulations that helps reconcile many divergent experimental ￿ndings. We
thus show that whereas challenges to a weakly held identity (low prior) elicit conformity e⁄ects,
e⁄ective challenges to a strongly held one (high prior) elicit forceful counterreactions aimed at
restoring the threatened beliefs.
Second, since the preferences and prospects of similar individuals are likely to be correlated,
￿deviant￿ behavior by peers ￿ violating norms and taboos, fraternizing with outsiders, etc.￿
conveys bad news about the value of existing social assets (anticipatory-utility version) or that
of future investments in them (imperfect self-control version). If the morally dubious action was
one￿ s own, on the other hand, it is good behavior by peers that is now threatening to the self-
concept, as it takes away potential excuses involving situational factors or moral ambiguity. In
both cases, ostracizing mavericks suppresses the undesirable reminders created by their presence.
Thus, depending on the perceived situational uncertainty and correlation of individual values, the
same agents will act prosocially and shun free riders, or act sel￿shly and shun moral exemplars.
Finally, our cognitive model naturally generates taboo tradeo⁄s and an aversion to engage in
even the mere contemplation of such choices. We show that upholding certain (endogenously)
valuable beliefs or illusions concerning the ￿incommensurable￿ value of certain goods, or the
and Dickens [1982], Loewenstein [1987], Rabin [1995], Caplin and Leahy [2001], Landier [2000], Brunnermeier and
Parker [2005]), K￿szegi [2004]) and those in which they serve a more instrumental role (Carrillo and Mariotti
[2000], BØnabou and Tirole [2002, 2006a], Battaglini et al. [2005], Dessi [2008]). In particular, we show that these
two classes of models lead to very similar behaviors but potentially opposite welfare consequences.
2See, e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith [1959] on cognitive dissonance and, especially, Bem [1972] on self-perception.
On the self-manipulation of ￿diagnostic￿actions see Quattrone and Tversky [1984].
3The idea of self-signaling or self-reputation makes the paper most closely related to Bodner and Prelec [2003]
and BØnabou and Tirole [2004]. Young [2006] and Dal Bo and Tervi￿ [2008] extend the single-agent analysis to
in￿nite horizons and steady-states, and Battaglini et al. [2005] and Bernheim and Thomadsen [2005] to one-shot,
strategic interactions with simultaneous moves. None of these papers deals with the empirical puzzles discussed
in Section I, nor with taboos, group norms or (anti)social sanctions.
2things one ￿would never do￿(various forms of selling out) can require shunning any evaluation,
in act or in thought, that might reveal what terms of trade could be obtained or would be
accepted.
While prosocial behavior is the main focus of our paper, many other social phenomena involve
beliefs which people treat as valuable assets. Religion is the most obvious one, but signi￿cant
resources are similarly invested to build up and defend national, cultural and even professional
identities. Our model therefore provides a unifying framework for the study of identity, and in
the last section of the paper we demonstrate its applicability across a wide range of behaviors.4
The model thus explains escalating commitments, in which someone who has built up
enough of some economic or social asset ￿ wealth, career, family, culture, etc.￿ continues to
invest in it even when the marginal return no longer justi￿es it. Intuitively, a higher stock raises
the stakes on viewing the asset as bene￿cial to one￿ s long-run welfare, and the way to reassure
oneself of its value is to keep investing. This leads to excessive specialization (e.g., work versus
family) and persistence in unproductive tasks. Most strikingly, one can even be made worse o⁄
by a higher capital stock, as the escalating-commitment mechanism leads to a treadmill e⁄ect
in which increases in wealth, social status, or professional achievement induce a self-defeating
pursuit of the belief that happiness lies in the accumulation of those same assets. The model
also sheds light on oppositional behaviors. When two identities are likely to compete later on for
time or resources, investing in one depreciates the perceived value of the other. An agent with
substantial capital vested in an insecure, hard-to-measure identity (e.g., cultural attachments)
may therefore refrain from pro￿table investments in others (education, labor market integration),
and even destroy valuable assets, ending up worse o⁄.
While the model￿ s positive results are quite general, the welfare consequences of the quest for
moral identity and other self-views, in contrast, depend importantly on whether the ￿demand￿
side re￿ ects mental-consumption motives (self-esteem, anticipatory utility) or instrumental ones
(self-discipline, sense of direction). In the ￿rst case, identity investments reduce an individual￿ s
ex-ante welfare, being in ￿ne a form of wasteful signaling. As a consequence, he is worse o⁄
with malleable beliefs or memory than with non-manipulable ones. When identity serves a
commitment purpose, by contrast, more malleable beliefs and the resulting ability to shape
them through actions can, under speci￿c conditions, increase welfare.
4The paper naturally relates to the growing literature on the economics of identity. In an in￿ uential set of
papers, Akerlof and Kranton [2000, 2002, 2005] emphasize how, in a wide range of contexts, agents￿preferences are
structured by their choices of a social category (see also Shayo [2009] on redistributive politics and Basu [2006] on
development). Greif [2009] models moral behavior based on similar self-categorization and preference externalities,
but with standards of conduct now strategically de￿ned by ￿moral authorities￿external to the group. In Rabin
[1994], Konow [2000] and Oxoby [2003, 2004], agents engage in ￿dissonance reduction￿ , again represented by
costly adjustments in utility parameters not tied to an information structure. By explicitly modeling the value
and management of beliefs our model endogenizes the identity prescriptions, payo⁄s and cognitive costs in this
broad class of models. This also leads to distinctive results such as non-monotonicities, information-aversion and
the fact that being able to manage his self-image can make a person worse o⁄.
3I Motivating facts and puzzles
Decisions on contributing to a public good, cooperating with others or enforcing a collective
norm ￿ in short, moral behavior￿ exhibit important inconsistencies with standard models of
socially-minded behavior. These recurrent patterns can be categorized into three main puzzles:
unstable altruism, coexistence of social and antisocial punishments, and taboo tradeo⁄s.
Unstable altruism. Prosocial behaviors in anonymous, one-shot interactions, where concerns
for social reputation are inoperative, are often taken to directly re￿ ect the extent of altruistic,
reciprocal or other fairness-valuing preferences in a population (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [1999]).
More recent ￿ndings however, show that it takes remarkably little to turn such behaviors on or
o⁄. The slightest change in framing, the thinnest of veils as to the moral implications of their
choices su¢ ces for many people to revert to self-interest. In fact, they will not just seize upon
such excuses and super￿cial ambiguity but actively seek them, foregoing to do so both material
payo⁄s and decision-relevant information. For instance, when decision-makers can avoid ￿nding
out whether taking a high payo⁄ for themselves will hurt or bene￿t someone else, over half
take advantage of this ￿moral wriggle room￿to behave sel￿shly (Dana et al. [2007]). Similarly,
many subjects will take $9 rather than having $10 to freely allocate between themselves and
an anonymous recipient, and the more likely to use such costly exit options are in fact those
who share the most when no opt-out is possible (Dana et al. [2006], Lazear et al. [2009]).5
Conversely, trivial cues making morality more salient, such as paying for performance in hard
cash rather than tokens redeemable for money, or reading the Ten Commandments at the start
of an experiment, dramatically increase cooperation and decrease cheating (Mazar et al. [2008]).
Two related forms of behavioral instability are history-dependence and non-monotonicity.
When a person has been induced to behave prosocially or sel￿shly, or just provided with signals
presumed to be informative about his morality, his choices in subsequent, unrelated interactions
are signi￿cantly a⁄ected. Moreover, this reaction sometimes ampli￿es the original manipulation,
and is sometimes in opposition to it. The well-known ￿foot-in the door￿e⁄ect, for instance,
documents how an initial request for a small favor (which most people accept) raises the prob-
ability of accepting costlier ones later on; similarly, a large initial request (which most people
reject) reduces later willingness to grant a smaller one (see DeJong [1979]). Yet, in di⁄erent
settings the same subject pools display ￿moral credentialing￿ , acting as if an initial good be-
havior (again, exogenously induced) provided a license to misbehave later on (Monin and Miller
[2001]). Similarly, people o⁄ered an opportunity to purchase ￿green￿products tend to respond
positively, but those who do buy are later on less likely to share in a dictator game, and more
likely to cheat on a task to increase their gains (Mazar and Zhong [2010], Zhong et al. [2010]).
Such reversals mirror earlier ￿ndings on the ￿transgression-compliance￿e⁄ect, in which people
5When given the opportunity, many people will also delegate a sharing decision to a third party likely to be
biased in their favor rather than do the ￿dirty deed￿themself (Hamman et al. [2009]).
4led to believe that they have harmed someone show later on an increased willingness to perform
unrelated good deeds (Carlsmith and Gross [1969]).
Social and antisocial punishments. Turning from single-agent settings to groups, one encoun-
ters similar inconsistencies in behavior and judgement. On the one hand, it is well established
that free-riders in public-good games, and violators of social norms more generally, get punished
by others (e.g., Fehr and G￿chter [2000]). On the other, there is growing evidence that those
who behave too well ￿ exhibiting stronger moral principles or resilience than their peers (ob-
jectors to injustice, vegetarians, whistle-blowers) or contributing ￿excessively￿to public goods￿
also elicit resentment, derogation and punishment from their peers (Monin [2001], Jordan and
Monin [2008], Monin et al. [2008]). Such moral relativism is not con￿ned to the laboratory but
also re￿ ected in cross-society-di⁄erences in civic norms. In countries where subjects in public-
goods experiments engage in more social (antisocial) punishment, surveys also show citizens to
be less (more) tolerant of cheating behaviors such as tax evasion or welfare fraud and more (less)
trusting in other people￿ s adherence to the rule of law (Herrman et al. [2008]).
Taboos thoughts and tradeo⁄s. Whereas economics views all goods as fungible, that is,
subject to tradeo⁄s, most societies and cultures hold certain ones to be ￿priceless￿or sacred:
life, justice, liberty, honor, love, religious faith, etc. (e.g., Durkheim [1925] ). It is thus considered
highly immoral to place a monetary value on marriage, friendship or loyalty to a cause. Markets
for organs, genes, sex, surrogate pregnancy and adoption are widely banned on grounds that
they would represent an unacceptable ￿commodi￿cation￿of human life. Admittedly, such rules
are often observed in the breach, and the boundaries between the secular and the sacred are
evolving ones, as demonstrated by changing attitudes toward life insurance (Zelizer [1999]),
pollution permits, or, in certain places, legalized prostitution. Nonetheless, taboos often do
bind, removing a number of activities from the traditional economic sphere or con￿ning them
to black markets (see, e.g., Kanbur [2004], Roth [2007]).
Most puzzling is the fact that people seek to enforce such taboos not only on others￿be-
havior (which could be accounted for by standard externalities) or even on their own (which
might re￿ ect a desire for precommitment), but even on their own thoughts and cognitions. Many
experiments document this ￿mere contemplation￿e⁄ect: when prompted to simply envision or
speculate about tradeo⁄s between sacred and secular values, subjects respond with noncompli-
ance, outrage, and later symbolic acts of moral cleansing (Fiske and Tetlock [1997], Tetlock et
al. [2000]). Their view, and that of the law in most countries, is that certain transactions are so
￿contrary to human dignity￿that they would a⁄ect even those who simply know or speculate
about them, by inviting ￿morally corrosive￿thoughts of fungibility. Yet what exactly is being
corroded by placing a hypothetical monetary value on certain goods or activities, and how this
damage occurs, is never really spelled out.
The patterns of behavior described in this section are not easily accounted for by existing
models. The choices of agents with altruistic, joy-of-giving, reciprocity or fairness concerns will
5(under anonymity) consistently re￿ ect these stable preferences, and not exhibit the ￿Jekyll and
Hyde￿reversals and path dependencies commonly seen in both lab and ￿eld. Similarly, agents
with social-identity motivations or other group-based preferences may engage in costly acts of
repair when their identity has been challenged or damaged, but will typically not show ￿licence￿
to misbehave when it has been a¢ rmed, nor the kind of ampli￿cation exempli￿ed by the ￿foot-
in-the-door￿e⁄ect. They may ostracize and punish those who violate group norms but not turn
against those who are the best exemplars of their chosen identities. Finally, in none of these
models will agents ever exhibit information avoidance, such as is consistently observed in ￿moral
wriggle room￿experiments and in the phenomenon of taboo thought.
The body of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and Section
III the main propositions, with moral identity and decisions as the leading application. Section
IV analyzes sacred values and taboo tradeo⁄s, then turns to the mechanism underlying both
social and antisocial norms. Section V gathers extensions of the model and applications to other
realms of behavior. Section VI o⁄ers directions for further research. Proofs are gathered in
Appendix A, details on the model￿ s extensions in Appendix B.
II The Model
￿An identity is a de￿nition, an interpretation, of the self... People who have problems with identity are
generally struggling with the di¢ cult aspects of de￿ning the self, such as the establishing of long-term
goals, major a¢ liations, and basic values.￿(Baumeister [1986]).
A Preferences and beliefs
There are three periods, t = 0;1;2, as illustrated in Figure I. An individual starts with initial
endowment A0 of some asset; from the ￿nal stock A2 he will derive long-run welfare vA2: In our
main application, A corresponds to social relationships and v re￿ ects the extent to which the
agent internalizes the welfare of others.6 We shall accordingly refer to A as ￿relational capital￿
and to v as altruism or prosocial orientation.7
6More generally, A can be any asset (human capital, wealth, status, religion-speci￿c good deeds, knowledge
of a culture, etc.) and v the individual￿ s long-run utility for the bene￿ts ￿ owing from it. See Section V on these
other dimensions of identity.
7The speci￿c form of the interactions involved is inessential for our purposes, but examples might be useful.
In the simplest one, At equals the agent￿ s cumulated contributions to other people￿ s welfare and v is how much
he cares about their well-being. Alternatively, let At be the number of people willing to engage with him in a
repeated-prisoner￿ s-dilemma type of interaction that starts at t = 2: Someone who places more weight on others￿
payo⁄s is less likely to cheat down the road, causing a break-up of the relationship and a loss of its bene￿ts to
both parties; he will thus value each social bond more highly. Partners￿investment in a relationship could also
be strategic complements, as in Rotemberg (1994). All that matters for our study of moral identity is that social
relationships be representable as assets (￿xed or accumulable, see (1)) with a continuation value, such as vA2;
that is higher for more prosocial individuals (see Assumption 3 more generally).
6At dates t = 0;1; the individual can ￿invest￿(at = 1), with return rt ￿ 0; or ￿not invest￿
(at = 0), so that
At+1 = At + atrt: (1)
Thus, by helping others, cooperating and contributing to public goods, he can enhance existing
relationships (raise the utility of people he cares about) or establish new ones (make friends,
gain productive partners). By behaving badly he will fail to increase At, or could even erode it;
we normalize (1) to measure the relative increase from choosing at = 1: We shall refer to at = 1
interchangeably as moral, prosocial or cooperative behavior, and to at = 0 as immoral, sel￿sh
or opportunistic behavior.8
The ￿investment￿action will in fact play a dual role. The ￿rst is standard accumulation,
when rt > 0: The second is informational: even when the current decision has no impact on
relational capital (rt = 0 for one-time encounters, tipping, etc.), the individual￿ s behavior will
constitute a signal of his altruism.
The central ingredient in the model is indeed that people are, at times, unsure of their own
deep preferences: moral standards, concern for others, strength of faith, etc. Such uncertainty
over ￿long-term goals, major a¢ liations, and basic values￿(Baumeister) means that the capital
stock A2 from which an individual will eventually derive bene￿ts may prove to be very important
to his long-run welfare, or not that meaningful.
￿ Date 0: At the start of period 0 the agent has access to a signal about his type, which may be
one of high or low altruism, H or L. Through an instinctive feeling of empathy, a temptation
to cheat or a conscious self-assessment, he obtains a momentary insight into his true nature,
v =
(
vH with probability ￿
vL with probability 1 ￿ ￿
; (2)
with vH > vL and ￿ v ￿ ￿vH + (1 ￿ ￿)vL denoting the prior expectation. Because a more
prosocial individual internalizes more of the bene￿ts accruing to other people, even in one-shot
interactions, he ￿nds it (weakly) less costly to act morally ￿ help, refrain from opportunism, etc.
Assumption 1 The net cost of investment at date 0 is cH
0 ? 0 for type H and cH




￿ Date 1. The standard assumption in economics is that people gain, through experience,
better knowledge of their preferences. For a person￿ s past actions to de￿ne his sense of identity,
however, it must be that he no longer has direct access to the deep motives and feelings that
8The speci￿c interaction involved is, again, not essential. Thus, rt can measure the return to the individual￿ s
e⁄orts in raising the welfare of those he cares about. Alternatively, it can capture, in reduced form, the average
propensity of partners to stay in the relationship, depending on how he has treated them.
7gave rise to these choices ￿ an information loss. Otherwise, past behavior conveys no useful
information, so there is no sense in which one can make (or claim to make) choices intended to
￿be true to myself,￿￿maintain my integrity,￿￿keep my self-respect￿ , ￿not betray my values￿ ,
￿be able to look at myself in the mirror,￿and the like. There is indeed extensive evidence that
people￿ s recall of their past feelings and true motives is highly imperfect and self-serving, that
they judge themselves by their actions and that many decisions are shaped by a concern to
achieve or maintain a desirable self-view, particularly in the moral domain.9
Assumption 2 (Self-inference). At date 1; the individual is aware (or reminded) of his true
valuation v only with probability ￿. With probability 1 ￿ ￿, he no longer recalls (has access to)
it and uses instead his past choice of a0 to infer his type.
Let us denote by ^ ￿ the individual￿ s date-1 belief about ￿what kind of a person￿he is and by
^ v ￿ ^ ￿vH + (1 ￿ ^ ￿)vL (3)
the corresponding expected valuation of A2; either of which de￿nes his (subjective) ￿sense of
identity￿at t = 1: With probability ￿ the posterior ^ v is thus equal to the original signal v; and
with probability 1 ￿ ￿ it is equal to the conditional expectation ^ v (a0) 2 [vL; vH] formed on
the basis of previous behavior. More generally, 1 ￿ ￿ should be thought of as the malleability
of beliefs through actions, and thus also re￿ ecting the possibility that deeds may themselves be
forgotten or repressed, or be uninformative due to situational factors that can be invoked as
plausible excuses.10
This process of self-inference can be thought of as the ￿supply side￿of motivated beliefs in
the model. We next turn to the ￿demand side,￿which encompasses most mechanisms that make
certain self-views more desirable than others. These include pure self-regard, anticipatory utility
and imperfect self-control, all of which can be represented by a continuation value V (v; ^ v;A1);
evaluated at t = 0; of entering period 1 with beliefs ^ v and capital A1:
Assumption 3 The value function V = V (v; ^ v;A1) satis￿es V2 > 0; V12 ￿ 0 and, if r0 > 0;
V13 > 0:
9On imperfect retrospective and prospective access to feelings and desires, see Kahneman et al. [1997] and
Loewenstein and Schkade [1999]. On self-perception and self-signaling, see footnote 2, Bodner and Prelec [2003]
and BØnabou and Tirole [2004]. Decisions problems with (exogenously) imperfect recall but no demand for
motivated beliefs were ￿rst studied in Piccione and Rubinstein [1993].
10If an action is uninformative with probability ￿; the posterior ^ v equals v; ￿ v or ^ v (a0) with respective proba-
bilities ￿; (1￿￿)￿ and (1￿￿)(1￿￿); so the e⁄ect on signaling incentives is similar to that of a decrease in 1￿￿:
For a model of self-reputation with misremembered actions and excuses, see BØnabou and Tirole [2004]. The
recall or awareness probability could also be di⁄erent for good and bad signals;￿H ￿ ￿L, whether exogenously or
endogenously (see BØnabou and Tirole [2002]). We focus here on the case in which ￿H = ￿L, both for simplicity
and to highlight the role of self-inference, which seems most relevant to ￿identity￿ .
8Figure I: Timing of Moves and Actions (for AU/SE and SC speci￿cations)
The ￿rst condition is mainly a ￿good identity￿convention: thus, a self-image of high morals
and concern for others is better than one of low morals and sel￿shness.11 The cross-partial
restrictions, together with cH
0 ￿ cL
0; will generate a sorting condition leading the H type to
always invest at least as much as the L one (behaving more prosocially), so that actions have
informational content. We exclude the trivial case where both types always invest, regardless of
identity concerns:
Assumption 4 V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL;A0) < cL
0:
The two ￿canonical￿examples of preferences leading to motivated beliefs are discussed below
and summarized in Figure I.
￿ Demand for beliefs 1: self-esteem (SE) or anticipatory utility (AU).
Someone who cares intrinsically about being, or having been over their lifetime, ￿the natural
and proper object of praise [or] blame￿(Smith [1759]) has preferences given by V = s^ v; where
s measures the strength of the self-esteem motive and ^ v is given by (3).12
Closely related to self-esteem but more consequentialist in nature are anticipatory emotions
￿ feelings of hopefulness, anxiety or dread that arise from contemplating one￿ s future material and
social prospects. Let long-term welfare be vA2, the expected value of social relationships: family,
friends, colleagues, ethnic group, etc. During period 1; an individual with subjective prosocial
identity ^ v experiences a utility ￿ ow s^ vA2; where the ￿savoring￿parameter s re￿ ects both the
intensity of such anticipatory feelings and their duration.13 Another important determinant of
s is salience ￿ the extent to which the individual thinks (perhaps prompted by an experimenter
or advertiser) about the contribution of A2 to his future welfare, and how it depends on where
his true values really lie.
11Furthermore, it will only be used to select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the case of multiplicity.
12Formally equivalent is a Calvinistic concern for being among the ￿chosen￿who are predestined for salvation
and given the ability to engage in virtuous work, rather than among the ￿reprobates￿ who are irredeemably
abandoned to sin and damnation.
13 The hedonic value of period-1 beliefs could also be nonlinear in probabilities (equivalently, in ^ v). Our positive
results (Propositions 1 and 2) apply unchanged such cases, as long as Assumption 3 is satis￿ed. Propositions 3 and
4 show, on the other hand, that normative conclusions do depend on linearity or the speci￿c form of nonlinearity.
9For simplicity, we focus here on pure anticipatory utility, in which there is no further decision
to be made at date 1.14 Thus a1 ￿ 0; A2 = A1 and the continuation value (evaluated from
t = 0) of entering period 1 with subjective identity ^ v is
V (v; ^ v;A1) ￿ (s^ v + ￿v)A1; (4)
where ￿ is the discount factor between dates 1 and 2.15 Assumption 2 is clearly satis￿ed, with
V13 > 0 ; V23 > 0 and V12 = 0:
Note also that self-esteem is a special case of anticipatory utility with At ￿ 1 (the only
relationship the agent cares about is with himself), rt ￿ 0 and ￿ = 0 (no ￿day of reckoning￿ ).
Accordingly, we shall study and refer to them together as the SE/AU case.
For welfare analysis, our criterion will be total intertemporal utility
W ￿ E[￿aoc0 + V ]; (5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution (￿;1 ￿ ￿) of values v 2
fvH;vLg and the distribution (￿;1 ￿ ￿) of (endogenous) posterior beliefs ^ v 2 fv; ^ v(a0)g:
￿ Demand for beliefs 2: self-control (SC)
People with self-esteem concerns or anticipatory emotions about the value of their social as-
sets want to hold certain beliefs for purely a⁄ective reasons. Maintaining a strong, stable sense
of identity also has functional value, helping one to make consistent choices and resist harmful
temptations. This adaptive role, equally stressed by psychologists, leads to our second bench-
mark case. It is particularly important in the context of social interactions, which inherently
feature a tradeo⁄between short-term gains from sel￿shness (or emotional release ) and long-run
bene￿ts from behaving morally.
Let long-term welfare still be given by vA2; but with moral decisions now taking place both
at t = 0 and at t = 1: Investment at t = 1 involves a stochastic cost c1, with type-independent
distribution F(c1) on R+:16 At date 1, moreover, weakness of will can make the immediate
gains from opportunism more salient than its distant consequences. The individual￿ s ￿Self 1￿
thus perceives the cost of acting morally as c=￿; where
￿ < vL=vH: (6)
14This restriction is relaxed in Appendix B.
15Note also that s=￿ re￿ ects also the relative lengths of periods 1 and 2: Any discounting between periods 0
and 1 is implicitly embodied as a common factor in s and ￿:
16Both assumptions are made for simplicity. The role of uncertainty over c1 is only to smooth over t = 1
decisions, so as to make V di⁄erentiable. The type-independence of F(￿) can also be relaxed, as long as realizations
of c1 are imperfectly informative about v; equivalently, the agent could need to make the t = 1 investment decision
before having experienced its full cost.
10This condition implies that whenever the agent (either the H type only, or both) chooses to
behave cooperatively, it is ex-ante e¢ cient for him to do so: if ￿￿vHr1 > c1; then ￿vLr1 > c1:
Sometimes, however, he will cave in to temptation and cheat or free-ride, thereby damaging his
own long-term interests (e.g., poorly raised child, broken marriage, criminal prosecution or other
forms of social retaliation).
Given a self-view ^ v; the agent invests when c1 ￿ ￿￿^ vr1; de￿ning a threshold cost level that
decreases with ^ v: Thus, a stronger moral identity generates valuable self-restraint. This is also
re￿ ected in the continuation value
V (v; ^ v;A1) ￿ ￿vA1 +
Z ￿￿^ vr1
0
(￿vr1 ￿ c1) dF (c1); (7)
which increases in ^ v; since (v ￿ ￿^ v)￿r1 ￿ (vL ￿ ￿vH)￿r1 > 0: The other conditions in Assump-
tion 2 are satis￿ed as well.
With regard to welfare analysis, it is no longer appropriate to just add up ￿c0a0 and E[V ];
since the agent will generally have present-biased preferences at date 0; just like at date 1: Thus,
if c0 is the perceived investment cost, the ￿real￿cost, as viewed by an ex-ante self or parent at
date ￿￿1￿ , is only ￿c0: Recalling that V is also an ex-ante value function, our welfare criterion
will be:
W = E[￿￿a0c0 + V ]: (8)
The two benchmark cases (AU/SE and SC) presented above can also be combined, so as
to determine when anticipatory emotions alleviate or worsen the self-discipline problem. This
￿mixed￿case, more relevant for dimensions of identity other than the moral one, will be examined
in Section V, together with other extensions of the basic framework.
B Interpreting the model
Before proceeding to solve the model, we point out three important ways in which it is more
broadly applicable than a literal reading might suggest. Readers wishing to skip this discussion
can proceed directly to the analysis in the next section.
￿ Identity as multidimensional. We focus the exposition on a single dimension of identity
(stock A and associated value v), using moral self-image as a running example. The model can,
however, equally represent a tradeo⁄ between two dimensions A and B; such as morality and
wealth, or family and career, linked by uncertainty over their relative value vA ￿ vB and a
resource or time constraint on total investment. The analysis is identical, with everything now
interpreted in a ￿di⁄erential￿sense, in terms of A relative to B (see Appendix B for details).
A second type of identity con￿ ict, arising from rivalry in consumption rather than investment,
is analyzed in Section V.C.
￿ Identity as a social object. In our main illustration, At corresponds to relationships with
11others and v to altruism or public-spiritedness. Other social aspects of identity may include
agents￿prior beliefs (￿) and, critically, information ￿ ows within a reference group. Section V.B
will thus study people￿ s responses to both norm-violators who fail to uphold a valued identity
and ￿do-gooders￿who uphold it too well.17
￿ Self-knowledge and a¢ rmation of values. The assumption that people have imperfect
insights into their own values and motives admits several formally equivalent interpretations:
(i) A moral sentiments view, in which people experience guilt or pride not only when actually
observed by others, but also from the virtual judgements of ￿imagined spectators￿(Smith [1759]).
(ii) An ego-superego view, in which v is simultaneously known at the subconscious level and
not known at the conscious level (Bodner and Prelec [2003] ). This corresponds in the model to
a limiting case of ￿instantaneous forgetting￿ .
(iii) Intergenerational transmission. In this polar case ￿forgetting￿takes a generation, so
the date-0 agent is a parent and the date-1 agent his child. Parents have experience with the
value of certain assets, such as the life satisfaction derived from social bonds versus money and
career, or the bene￿ts that religion might yield. Children start less informed and learn (with
probability 1 ￿ ￿) from the example that their parents set, or from what they force them to do
(a0): Parents strive, altruistically or sel￿shly, to inculcate in their children ￿values￿(beliefs ^ v)
that will enrich their lifetime experience or lead them to take desirable actions.
III Equilibrium and Welfare
A Behavior
At date 0; each type chooses his action optimally, taking into account the impact that may result
for his self-concept at date 1 and the a⁄ective and/or functional payo⁄s that ￿ ow from it. Thus





0 a0 + ￿V (vk;v;A0 + a0r0) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (vk; ^ v (a0);A0 + a0r0)
o
; (9)
where the posterior beliefs ^ v (a0) in case of self-inference are derived from Bayes￿rule. 18 Denoting
by xH and xL the respective probabilities that types H and L behave prosocially at t = 0; this
17Di⁄erent social aspects of identity are explored by Fryer and Jackson [2003], who show optimal categorization
can lead to ethnic stereotypes, and by Fang and Loury [2005], who model group identity as a shared convention
(akin to a language) for the transmission of information.
18By modeling agents as Bayesian, and thus aware that they sometimes make decisions seeking to maintain or
enhance a valued identity, we are treating them as fairly sophisticated. Relaxing this ￿metacognition￿assumption
(e.g., BØnabou and Tirole [2002]) would make the model￿ s positive results only stronger, but lead in certain cases
to di⁄erent welfare implications (see footnote 27). Note also that while our model has beliefs entering agents￿
utility functions, as in ￿psychological games￿(Geanakoplos et al. [1989]), these beliefs are about types, not actions
￿ whether by others or oneself. As a result, standard equilibrium concepts and re￿nements for games of imperfect
information remain directly applicable.
12means that ^ v (a0) ￿ ^ ￿(a0)vH + [1 ￿ ^ ￿(a0)]vL; where
^ ￿(1) =
￿xH
￿xH + (1 ￿ ￿)xL
and ^ ￿(0) =
￿(1 ￿ xH)
￿(1 ￿ xH) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xL)
(10)
for all (xH;xL) not equal to (0;0) and (1;1) respectively. To lighten the notation, let us de￿ne
the expected value function
V(v; ^ v;A1) ￿ ￿V (v;v;A1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (v; ^ v;A1); (11)
which brings together the demand (preferences) and supply (cognition) sides of the model,
inheriting from V all the properties in Assumption 3. Investing at t = 0 is thus an optimal
strategy for type k = H;L if
V(vk; ^ v (1);A0 + r0) ￿ V(vk; ^ v (0);A0) ￿ ck
0 ￿ 0: (12)
￿ The sorting condition. There are three reasons why this net return to ￿good behavior￿ is
greater for the H type than the L one, implying that ^ v (1) ￿ ^ v (0) on the equilibrium path.
First, the H type has a lower e⁄ective cost, cH
0 ￿ cL
0: Second, when V13 > 0; he attaches greater
value to any increment to the capital stock. Finally, if V12 > 0 he also cares more about having
a ￿strong￿identity at date 1, which investing helps achieve if ^ v (1) > ^ v (0):
From now on, we shall restrict attention to monotonic Perfect Bayesian equilibria, de￿ned
as those in which: (a) the high-value type always invests more: xH ￿ xL; which given (12) again
means that xH = 1 whenever xL > 0; (b) a (stronger) form of monotonicity is also imposed on
o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs: if xH = xL = 0; then ^ ￿(1) ￿ 1; symmetrically, if xH = xL = 1;
then ^ ￿(0) ￿ 0: This re￿nement is intuitive and does not a⁄ect any qualitative results.19
Finally, over a certain range of parameters there may be multiple (three) monotonic equilib-
ria, among which one is Pareto-dominant and will be selected.20
Proposition 1 There exists a unique (monotonic, undominated) equilibrium, characterized by
thresholds ~ ￿ and ￿ ￿ with 0 < ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and investment probabilities xH(￿) and xL(￿) such that:
(1) xH(￿) = 1 for ￿ < ￿ ￿ and xH(￿) = 0 for ￿ > ￿ ￿;
(2) xL(￿) is non-decreasing on [0; ~ ￿]; equal to 1 on [~ ￿; ￿ ￿) when ~ ￿ < ￿ ￿ and equal to 0 on [￿ ￿;1]:




19It is implied for instance by the Never a Weak Best Response (NWBR) criterion if V12 = 0 (as is the case for
the SE=AU speci￿cation of the model).
20An equilibrium Pareto dominates another one if it yields a weakly higher payo⁄ to both types and a strictly
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Figure II: Equilibrium as a function of ￿. Left panel: solid line = xH(￿); dashed line = xL(￿); for
decreasing values of cL
0: Right panel: average investment x(￿):
(i) No investment: when ￿ is high enough (￿ > ￿ ￿); the H type can a⁄ord not to invest: since
the other one also behaves opportunistically the posterior will equal the prior, which is already
close to 1 and thus could not be increased much anyway.21
When initial self-image is below the threshold ￿ ￿; on the other hand, the H type needs to
invest in order to ￿stand for his principles￿and separate from the less moral L type. Turning
now to the latter￿ s behavior, one of three cases arises.
(ii) Separation: when cL
0 is su¢ ciently high, the low-valuation type does not ￿nd it worth-
while to invest (xL = 0); whereas the high-valuation type does.
(iii) Randomization by vL : for lower values of cL
0; it becomes desirable for the L type to
imitate the H type, but his ability to do so pro￿tably is limited by the prior (0 < xL < 1; ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿):
The lower is ￿; the more truthful (low xL) his strategy must be in order for investment to signal
a high value with su¢ cient credibility; see (10).
(iv) Universal investment: for cL
0 still lower, even a small gain in self-image is worth pursuing,
so the low-valuation type pools completely with the other one (xL = 1); provided ￿ is above the
threshold ~ ￿ (which increases with cL
0):
Having fully characterized equilibrium behavior, we now derive comparative-statics predic-
tions and relate them to experimental evidence. We shall say that an individual invests more in
identity ￿ in our example, behaves more prosocially￿when both xH and xL (weakly) increase.
The total probability of investment, ￿ x ￿ ￿xH + (1 ￿ ￿)xL, also rises as a consequence.22
Proposition 2 (1) An individual invests more in identity:
(i) the more malleable his beliefs (the lower ￿);
21The case ￿ ￿ < 1 arises only when investment is not so intrinsically desirable for the high-value agent (H type)
to engage in for its own sake, without any signaling motive.
22Given Proposition 1, the fact that (for all ￿) xH increases also means that ￿ ￿ increases, and the fact that (for
all ￿) xL increases also means that either xL(￿ ￿) increases or xL(￿ ￿) = 1 and e ￿ decreases.
14(ii) the lower the investment cost (the lower cL
0 or cH
0 );
(iii) the more salient the identity in the SE/AU case (higher s);
(iv) the higher the capital stock A0 in the AU case.
(2) Initial beliefs have a nonmonotonic, hill-shaped, e⁄ect on overall investment: ￿ x increases
linearly in ￿ on [0; ~ ￿); equals 1 on [~ ￿; ￿ ￿); then falls to 0 beyond.
B Implications and evidence on moral identity and behavior
These results can help understand a broad range of empirical phenomena. While some of those
admit alternative explanations (learning by doing, habit formation or unstable preferences), a
di⁄erent story would have to be invoked in each case. We aim instead to provide a uni￿ed
account, which also extends to other evidence considered later on in the paper.
1) Malleability of beliefs. An increase in the ex-ante probability ￿ that the individual will
remain aware, or be reminded of, his true preferences and motives, reduces investment. Identity-
management is thus most likely to occur in domains where veri￿able, hard information about
deep values is scarce (e.g., morality, love, religion). A second, more operationalizable source of
variation in ￿ is the extent to which actions are informative about one￿ s underlying ￿character￿
or could instead be attributed to mistakes, rationalized by situational factors, etc.23
Dana et al. [2007] document the importance of such inferential ￿wriggle room￿for altruistic
self-image. When subjects in a dictator-like game did not know whether their payo⁄and that of
the recipient were positively or negatively related, but could ￿nd out at no cost, over half of them
chose not to know and proceeded to make the self-serving choice; when faced with an explicit
tradeo⁄, by contrast, two-thirds chose a ￿fair￿allocation. Mazar et al. [2008] document a similar
e⁄ect of attributional ambiguity on self-imposed honesty: when subjects whose payment was
based on their self-reported, unveri￿able performance on a task earned their compensation in the
form of tokens that would later on be exchanged for money (at a known rate), the overin￿ ating
of claims (assessed relative to a veri￿able-performance benchmark) was 50% higher than when
they had to lie for cash directly.
Delegation is another ￿veil￿ that commonly allows people to make sel￿sh decisions while
protecting their moral self-image. Hamman et al.[2010] show that recipients in dictator games
receive much less when principals have the option to delegate the sharing decision to a third
party. These agents compete to be ￿hired￿by developing a reputation for favoring principals,
and principals systematically seek those known to be the least generous with recipients.
In all these experiments, the fact that such a thin veil allows drastic increases in actual
sel￿shness is also a clear indication of the presence and power of self-deception.
2) Salience of identity. In Mazar et al. [2008], making the issue of personal honesty more
23See footnote 10 for a formal correspondence between potential excuses and decrease in 1 ￿ ￿:
15salient (increasing s) by having subjects read the Ten Commandments or a university￿ s honor
code before performing tasks in which they could cheat on their claimed performance without
risk of detection led to signi￿cant decreases in claims in￿ ation.
In the marketplace, an important instance of the same mechanism is consumers￿fast-growing
expenditure on ￿symbolic￿goods such as carbon o⁄sets, green products and the like, largely
spurred by advertising campaigns that manipulate the salience of people￿self (and social) im-
age. The fact that most of the same households vote against environmental taxes, together
with experiments documenting the moral-licensing e⁄ects of green purchases (Mazar and Zhong
[2010]), provides further support for the idea that such expenditures are in large part identity
investments.
3) Uncertain values. The overall (ex-ante) probability of investment ￿ x is hill-shaped with
respect to ￿ : intuitively, investing in self-reputation has a low return when the prior is low,
and is not needed when it is already high (provided ￿ ￿ < 1):24 This means, ￿rst, that identity-
a¢ rming behaviors are characteristic of people with unsettled preferences and values; hence the
moral zeal of the new convert (religious or political), or the exacerbated nationalism of the recent
immigrant. Second, the predicted hill-shape of behavior with respect to ￿ can help reconcile
two contradictory sets of experimental ￿ndings on people￿ s responses to manipulations of their
self-image.
(i) Threats to a strongly held identity (e.g., being a decent, moral person) trigger large op-
posing responses aimed at restoring the damaged self-image ￿ as occurs in the model when ￿
is caused to fall below ￿ ￿: A good example is the ￿transgression-compliance￿ e⁄ect (e.g., Carl-
smith and Gross [1969]): subjects who are led to believe that they have harmed someone (by
administering painful electric shocks, or carelessly ruining some of her work) show an increased
willingness to later on accept requests to perform a good action, even though the requester is
not their ￿victim￿and does not even know about their ￿misdeed￿ . Religions understand well,
and make frequent use of, this demand for atonement (e.g., Kuran [1996], Cassone and Marchese
[1999]). Symmetrically, subjects with freshly acquired ￿moral credentials￿as non-prejudiced
persons show a greater willingness to subsequently express politically incorrect opinions and
make employment recommendations that conform to ethnic or racial stereotypes (Monin and
Miller [2001]).25
(ii) Manipulating weaker aspects of identity (e.g., being helpful, kindhearted), on the other
hand, tend to induce con￿rmatory rather than ￿ghting responses ￿ as occurs in the model when ￿
24This non-monotonicity is the general and robust insight from Proposition 2, rather than the speci￿c piecewise-
linear response illustrated in the right panel of Figure II. Thus, if small amounts of individual heterogeneity are
introduced in the parameters that a⁄ect ~ ￿ and ￿ ￿; aggregation will result in a ￿smoothed￿version of ￿ x(￿) that ￿rst
increases, then decreases.
25To rule out a social-signaling explanation, the two rounds of choices were also administered as ostensibly
di⁄erent experiments, inducing subjects to believe that the second experimenter would not know of their previously
established ￿credentials￿ , or lack thereof. The results were statistically unchanged.
16changes marginally, starting from below ~ ￿: Such is the case with the ￿foot in the door￿e⁄ect (e.g.,
DeJong [1979] ), in which freely accepting an initial request for a small favor raises the probability
of accepting a more costly one in the future. Conversely, an initial costly request, which most
people turn down, decreases the probability of accepting a smaller one later on.26Identity and
welfare: treadmill e⁄ect or empowerment?
While the model￿ s equilibrium-behavior and comparative-statics results are very general,
relying only on Assumptions 1 to 3, the implications of belief management for an individual￿ s
welfare depend on whether it re￿ ects a demand for ￿consumable thoughts￿ or instrumental
concerns.
1) Self-esteem / anticipatory utility and the treadmill e⁄ect.
Equations (4)-(5) lead to
W = ￿xH
￿
(s + ￿)vHr0 ￿ cH
0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)xL
￿
(s + ￿)vLr0 ￿ cL
0
￿
+ (s + ￿)vA0: (13)
The last term is constant: although agents actively manage their self-views, this is a zero-sum
game across types, by the law of iterated expectations.27 As to the ￿rst two terms, they always
(weakly) decrease as identity investments rise in response to a greater malleability of beliefs,
1 ￿ ￿: This is immediate to see when self-regard is the sole motive underlying moral behavior,
and more generally when the identity-related asset is ￿xed: with r0 = 0; there remains only a net
loss of ￿￿xHcH
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xLcL
0:28 The result ￿ a form of wasteful signaling induced by imperfect
self knowledge￿applies equally when identity capital can be accumulated.
More strikingly, an increase in his capital stock can also make the individual worse o⁄.
Indeed, the condition for a no-investment equilibrium (xH = xL = 0);
V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ V(vH;v;A0) = (s + ￿)vHr0 + (1 ￿ ￿)s(vH ￿ ￿ v)A0 ￿ cH
0 ; (14)
ceases to hold as A0 crosses some threshold level. At that point investment jumps up discretely,
resulting in a net welfare loss, by the same reasoning as above.29
The model thus yields a type of treadmill e⁄ect: higher asset levels do no generate much of
26In neither case are the results due to self-selection, since the probabilities being compared are the average
compliance rates between the members of an experimental group (who get two requests) and those of a control
group (who get only the second request).
27 For welfare gains to arise, it must thus be that either: (a) agents￿updating is at least partially na￿ve: when
a0 = 1; they do not properly correct for pooling by the L type, resulting in a departure from the martingale
property of Bayesian beliefs. This additional form of malleability could easily be incorporated into the model
(e.g., BØnabou and Tirole [2002]); or (b) the consumption value of beliefs is nonlinear (and thus not purely
anticipatory in the standard sense), as in Rabin [1995], Caplin and Leahy [2001] and K￿szegi [2009].
28Each product xkc
k
0; k = H;L; is (weakly) decreasing in ￿ if c
k
0 > 0; or constant if c
k
0 ￿ 0; since (12) then
implies xk = 1:
29Equation (14) leads to a loss when c
H
0 > (s+￿)vHr0: Otherwise, xH ￿ 1 and a loss arises from the counterpart
of (14) that focuses on how xL rises with A0:
17an increase in life satisfaction, or may even reduce it ￿ and this precisely due to a self-defeating
pursuit of the belief that these assets will ensure happiness, or forestall misery.30 In the moral
realm, one can point to religious and political zealotry (all the way to self-morti￿cation), or the
compulsive internalization of honor and shame. The most economically relevant applications of
the result, however, concern assets such as wealth or prestige. Studies of ￿hedonic forecasting￿
thus suggest that people tend to overestimate the contribution of material or status goods to
their long-term life-satisfaction, relative to time spent in personal relationships or doing good,
such as volunteering (see, e.g., Stutzer and Frey [2007] for a survey).
The model also sheds some light on these di⁄erences: a treadmill e⁄ect is more likely in
activities that are subject to decreasing returns, which cause the material return r0v to fall
relative to the savoring motive, sA0 (^ v ￿ ￿ v):31 Diminishing marginal utility of consumption
thus makes a treadmill e⁄ect in material pursuits likely at high wealth levels, but a non-issue
for the poor. Personal relationships and good deeds are arguably less subject to decreasing
returns ￿ those may even be increasing, through network e⁄ects and the spreading of reputation.
Consequently, a moral treadmill is much less likely than a material one.
Proposition 3 In the anticipatory utility or self-image case,
(1) An increase in the malleability of beliefs (1 ￿ ￿) always reduces welfare.
(2) An increase in (per se valuable) capital A0 can make the individual worse o⁄.
(3) An increase in salience s can also lower welfare.
An important caveat is that the welfare analysis is conducted here from the perspective of
one agent, and thus abstracts from the external costs and bene￿ts that his behavior generates
for others. Even when considering social welfare, however, the point remains that while costly
actions are incurred partly for self-image purposes, their overall impact on it is zero. Therefore
even though everyone values identity per se, its social value, positive or negative, must be found
entirely in its ￿side-products￿ .32
2) Willpower and the commitment value of identity
30Ours is thus a di⁄erent mechanism for treadmill e⁄ects from the traditional one, which is based on preferences
or ￿aspirations￿adapting to changes in consumption levels.
31Let utility from a long-run stock A2 be v￿(A2) instead of vA2; where ￿ is concave. The total return to
investing at t = 0 is then (s^ v(1) + ￿)￿(A0 + r0) ￿ [s^ v(0) + ￿￿(A0)] ￿ s[^ v(1) ￿ ^ v(0)]￿(A0) + r0￿
0(A0)[s^ v(1) + ￿)];
provided r0=A0 is not too large. Decreasing marginal utility from A; leading to a low ￿
0(A0), is thus equivalent
to a low r0 in the linear speci￿cation (or, also, to a technology where r0 falls with A0):
32Sen [1985] discusses identity as personal ￿commitments￿￿ distinct from any kind of altruistic utility function
or ￿goal￿ ￿which individuals feel bound to respect even though this may lower their own welfare, while bene￿ting
others. Our model shows how such a notion can be formalized, in a way consistent with consequentialist rationality.
Thus, a rule to ￿always￿cooperate (a0 = 1) because ￿that is what a good person does, and this is who I am￿ ,
can: (i) be self-enforcing although it lowers U
i
0 when taking others￿actions as ￿xed; (ii) in general equilibrium,
yield a Pareto improvement. In the self-control version of the model, such cognitive commitments can also serve
the individual￿ s own long-term ￿goals￿ , while running against (and constraining) his short-term preferences.
18In the basic self-control version of the model, A0 has no behavioral impact, as seen from (7).33
The malleability of beliefs, on the other hand, now a⁄ects behavior both at t = 0 and at t = 1:
Suppose for instance that: (a) for ￿ = 1; neither type behaves prosocially at t = 0 : cH
0 > ￿vHr0,
so xH = xL = 0; (b) for some ￿ < 1; on the contrary, the equilibrium involves mixing: the more
altruistic type always cooperates (xH = 1); while the more sel￿sh one randomizes (0 < xL < 1):34
The di⁄erence in intertemporal welfare W = E [￿￿a0c0 + V ] between these two cases is then










+ (1 ￿ ￿)E [￿V ]; (15)
where E [￿V ] re￿ ects the e⁄ects of self-image management on date-1 behavior:
E [￿V ] = (1 ￿ ￿)xL
Z ￿￿^ v(1)r1
￿￿vLr1
(￿vLr1 ￿ c1) dF (c1) ￿ ￿
Z ￿￿vHr1
￿￿^ v(1)r1
(￿vLr1 ￿ c1) dF (c1): (16)
The ￿rst term in (16) shows how, when the L type invests at t = 0; this strengthens his moral
self-regard and thereby raises his subsequent propensity to behave well. At the same time, such
pooling at t = 0 dilutes the identity of the H type, and this self-doubt increases the likelihood
that he will be succumb to opportunism. Since prosocial investment at t = 1, when it occurs, is
always ex-ante optimal (by (6)), the ￿rst e⁄ect leads to a welfare gain, the second to a loss.35
Turning now to the direct contribution of date-0 behavior to intertemporal welfare, if ￿ is
low enough that (say) the ￿rst two terms in (15) are positive, ex-ante e¢ cient investments fail
to occur in period 0 if ￿ = 1 : from the very start, the agent behaves too opportunistically for
his own good. The ability to a⁄ect his self-image (￿ < 1) provides additional motivation for
acting prosocially at t = 0; which then directly raises ￿W: When the ￿rst two terms in (15)
are positive, conversely, such good behavior entails a net cost, which only pays o⁄ in terms of
improved self-restraint at t = 1 if E[￿V ] su¢ ciently positive.
Proposition 4 In the self control case, more malleable beliefs (a lower ￿) can raise welfare, by
improving choices at t = 1 (when E [￿V ] > 0) and/or at t = 0 (when ￿W > (1 ￿ ￿)E[￿V ]):
33Unless A0 a⁄ects the return r0 or cost c0; which would be easy to incorporate. There could thus be decreasing
returns to social capital; or, on the contrary, a transgression (a0 = 0) could destroy not just a ￿xed number r0 of
long-term relationships but a ￿xed fraction of the existing stock A0:
34This is without loss of generality: a similar reasoning applies for complete pooling (whether on 0 or on 1);
with ^ v(1) simply replaced by ￿ v: Of course, the nature of the equilibrium, including the value of ^ v(1); is endogenous
and depends on the distribution F(c1): The proof of Proposition 4 takes this ￿xed-point aspect into account.
35More speci￿cally, when F(￿) is such that the support of c1=￿￿r1 is mostly concentrated in the interval [vL; ^ v(1)];
meaning that the (opportunity) cost of good behavior and the magnitude of the self-control problem are relatively
moderate, there is a net gain from malleability. When they are more severe, so that the support is mostly
concentrated in [^ v(1);vH]; there is a net loss.
19IV Taboos and Transgressions
Taboos and sacred values are closely related to identity, in the sense of protecting certain beliefs
(or illusions), deemed vital for the individual or for society, concerning things one ￿would never
do￿ and the ￿incommensurable￿ value of certain goods. We distinguish two complementary
ways in which they operate ￿ ex ante and ex post. The ￿rst, internally enforced, aims to avoid
dangerous (self-) knowledge that might surface from ￿cold￿analytical contemplation of what
short-run tradeo⁄s might be available or expedient. The second one, socially enforced, is a
form of information destruction aimed at repairing the damage to beliefs caused when someone,
through his actions or speech, has violated a norm or taboo.
A Sacred values, taboo tradeo⁄s and markets: information avoidance
￿To compare is to destroy￿(Fiske and Tetlock [1997])
Let v 2 fvH;vLg continue to denote the long-run value of some important asset, with asso-
ciated capital At: In the social-moral realm this again could be family, friends, clan, country, or
religion. In the personal one it could be health, bodily integrity, or personal freedom. We saw
how, for motives of either anticipatory utility (possibly extending to an afterlife) or self control
(temptations to erode At for short-term gains), people will often want to be optimistic about v;
resulting in a value function V (v; ^ v;A1) satisfying Assumption 3.
Suppose now that, at t = 0; an agent can ￿nd out the ￿sellout￿price p at which he could
exchange one unit of A0 against money or other goods of known consumption value. A priori,
the price could be high or low,
p =
(
pH with probability z
pL with probability 1 ￿ z
: (17)
Depending on the context, the actual value may be learned by checking what is being o⁄ered
on a formal or informal market (for loyalties, votes, crime, organs, sex, children, etc.) or by
simply engaging in deliberate, ￿coldhearted￿calculations about the personal costs and bene￿ts
of di⁄erent courses of action.
To simplify the problem, let pH be high enough and pL low enough that, if an agent does
ascertain the price (a0 = 0); he will always transact when p = pH; reducing A0 by one unit, and
not transact when p = pL:36 Even in the latter case, he will later recall that he contemplated the
possibility of a transaction and evaluated whether maintaining his identity or dignity was ￿worth
36Formally, this is a dominant strategy for both types k = H;L; provided that pH > V(vH;vH;A0) ￿
V(vH;vL;A0 ￿ 1) and pL < V(vL;vH;A0) ￿ V(vL;vL;A0 ￿ 1): In the absence of such conditions, or with a
more general price distribution, there may be two signals of an agent￿ s type: whether he looked into the price
and, if so, whether he transacted or not, given the price. We isolate here the ￿rst e⁄ect, which is the relevant one
for the idea that certain things should remain ￿priceless￿and the presence of a ￿mere contemplation e⁄ect￿ .
20it￿or not. From this fact he will then have to draw (with probability 1 ￿ ￿) the appropriate
inference about where his true values lie.
Investing in moral identity (a0 = 1) thus consists here in upholding a rule never to place
a price on certain goods ￿ staying away from markets where such transactions occur, not en-
tertaining for a second any ￿indecent proposal￿ one may receive, and forbidding oneself even
mere thoughts of commensurability. The cost of doing so is the option value of the potential
transactions foregone, so an individual with value v = vH;vL will uphold the taboo if
V(v;^ v(1);A0) ￿ V(v;^ v(0);A0 ￿ z) ￿ zpH; (18)
with the same notation as usual.37
This is clearly a special case of our model, with r0 = z; c0 = zpH and initial stock A0
0 ￿ A0￿z:
Therefore, all previous results apply directly:
(1) On the positive side, Propositions 1 and 2 show how taboos arise and are sustained, either
universally (full-investment equilibrium) or predominantly by the more committed (mixing or
separating equilibrium); how this depends on the initial strength of beliefs, ￿; and how challenges
to taboos or transgressions by others can lead to rea¢ rmation or collapse, according to which
side of the ￿hill￿(Figure II, right panel) the induced erosion of ￿ occurs on.38
(2) On the normative side, Propositions 3 and 4 show how the welfare e⁄ect of taboos
depends importantly on whether they re￿ ect anticipatory or self-control motives. In the ￿rst
case, upholding taboos generally lowers an individual￿ s ex-ante welfare.39 In the latter it can be
bene￿cial, but only under speci￿c conditions involving the severity of the self-control problem.40
B Dealing with sinners and saints: information destruction
￿Anyone who has violated a taboo becomes taboo himself, because he possesses the dangerous quality
37 We assume that transacting without ￿rst ￿nding out the price is either infeasible, or else unpro￿table (due to
the average ￿auction￿price zpH +(1￿z)pL being too low). In writing the second term in (18) we took advantage
of the linearity of V in A1 under both the AU and the SC models (and their combination in Example 3). More
generally, it would be zV(v;^ v(0);A0 ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ z)V(v;^ v(0);A0); which leaves all the results unchanged.
38 Because they involve the avoidance of normally valuable information, taboos are related to the strategic
ignorance in Carrillo and Mariotti [2000] and Carrillo [2005], and especially to the rule-based behavior in BØnabou
and Tirole [2004]. There are, however, two important di⁄erences. On the demand side, imperfect willpower
is here only one of several potential sources of motivated beliefs. On the supply side, it is the mere act of
exploring the price to be gained from certain transactions, rather than the price thus revealed or whether the
transaction is actually ￿consumed￿ , that destroys the valued belief. In Fershtman et al., [2008], the bene￿t of
taboo contemplation is also the option value of ￿nding out that one might bene￿t (on net) from engaging in a
socially reprehensible action. The cost deterring from taboo contemplation, on the other hand, is an exogenously
assumed function of how many other people are believed to be refraining from it.
39Unless agents are su¢ ciently non-Bayesian, or the consumption value of beliefs appropriately nonlinear.
40The impact of taboos on individual and on social welfare will of course di⁄er when agents￿actions have
direct externalities on others (in addition to the informational spillovers on which we focus here). Dessi [2008]
analyzes the role of indoctrination by a benevolent principal in such public-goods contexts, and BØnabou [2008]
the contagiousness of beliefs, as well as responses to dissent.
21of tempting others to follow his example: why should he be allowed to do what is forbidden to others?
Thus he is truly contagious in that every example encourages imitation, and for that reason he himself
must be shunned￿ . (S. Freud, Totem and Taboo, p.86).
Consider now a situation where someone has behaved ￿immorally￿￿ exhibiting sel￿shness
or, through his words or actions, breaking a taboo. How will others respond, and how will the
violator himself react to such lapses? We seek to understand in particular the coexistence of
social and antisocial punishments: in some cases people ostracize (or even incur personal costs
to hurt) the less virtuous, and in others the more virtuous members of their group (Monin [2001],
Jordan and Monin [2008], Monin et al. [2008], Herrmann et al. [2008]).
Our analysis builds on a simple benchmarking idea: in assessing what kind of a person they
are, people compare themselves to others whom they feel are akin to them or face a similar
environment. ￿Deviant￿ behavior by peers (a0 = 0) sends a negative signal about the value
of the existing capital stock (anticipatory utility version) or that of motivation-sensitive future
investments (imperfect willpower version). Thus, members of a religious, ethnic or national
community who are not fully supportive of its positions or mingle with outsiders undermine
others￿sense of commitment to (belief in) the common value. If the lapsed individual is oneself,
on the other hand, it is good behavior by peers that is now threatening to the self-concept, as
it takes away potential excuses involving situational factors or moral ambiguity. In either case,
the exclusion of mavericks from the group suppresses the undesirable reminders created by their
presence: ￿out of sight, out of mind￿ . That is, exclusion lowers ￿:
￿ The person and the situation.41 Consider the two-agent generalization of the basic model
that is illustrated on Figure III. The ￿rst new element is that, with ex-ante probability ￿; there
is a valid ￿excuse￿for not behaving in an identity-congruent manner. To keep with our main
example, this corresponds to a situation where choosing a0 = 1 is useless ￿ perhaps even harmful￿
to the rest of society, or where the private cost is so high that even the most moral types (H)
would choose a0 = 0. With probability 1 ￿ ￿; on the other hand, the action a0 = 1 is socially
bene￿cial, so performing it can be a sign of valuing others. Formally, for an individual with
altruism type k = H;L; the return in terms of relational capital is now rk
0 = ￿vk; where ￿ = 1
when the action is useful to others and ￿ ￿ 0 when it is not. In the former case the net costs
involved are still cH
0 < cL
0; in the latter, they are ~ cH
0 ￿ ~ cL
0; re￿ ecting the fact that a more
prosocial agent is less inclined to engage in a socially harmful action.
The second new element is that the two agents, after observing each other￿ s action, decide
whether to continue in the relationship (yi = 0) or to break it (yi = 1): If either leaves, both
lose the bene￿t b of future interactions, which we take to be symmetric and type-independent for
simplicity. To allow for ex-post rationalizations as to why the separation occurred, we assume
41We borrow here from the title of Ross and Nisbett￿ s [1991] classical book in social psychology.
22Figure III: The ostracism game
that matches also dissolve for independent reasons, with exogenous probability ￿: Agent i￿ s
utility function is thus:
(vi￿ ￿ ci
0)ai
0 + V(vi;b vi;A0 + r0ai
0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ y)b; (19)
where y ￿ 1 ￿ (1 ￿ yi)(1 ￿ yj) is the probability that ostracism occurs.
At date 1; each agent always remains aware of his own behavior ai
0; but he recalls (or is
reminded of) that of his partner only if they are still together. If a split occurred, he recalls
neither a
j
0 nor what caused the separation. The idea is that, whereas what one did is ￿hard￿
data that is relatively easy to remember and verify, the past behavior of someone with whom
contact has ceased and the true reasons why the split occurred represents softer, less veri￿able
information. And it is always more pleasant, ceteris paribus, to ￿recall￿whatever scenario is
the most kind to one￿ s self-image. These no-recall assumptions are extreme and meant only
to simplify the derivations. All that is needed for the results is that ostracism reduces the
probability that people are reminded of the bad news conveyed by their peers￿behavior.
We allow for two polar forms of benchmarking:
￿ Benchmarking on the person: in this version the date-0 contribution is always socially
useful (￿ ￿ 1), as has been assumed so far; equivalently, there is never any excuse for not
supplying it. Moreover, the two individuals￿values are perfectly correlated: v1 = v2 2 fvH;vLg:
￿ Benchmarking on the situation: in this version, the two types are independent, but the
social usefulness (￿ = 1, with probability ￿) or absence thereof (￿ ￿ 0, with probability 1 ￿ ￿)
of the date-0 contribution is situation-speci￿c, and the same for both agents. When faced with
a given situation agents are able to assess ￿; but later on it, too, is subject to imperfect recall
(or self-serving memory distortion) with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
We shall focus on symmetric equilibria (in undominated strategies) in which the more al-
truistic type always invests when ￿ = 1 and no one invests when ￿ ￿ 0 (either ￿ is su¢ ciently
23negative, or ￿ = 0 and the value of self-image is low enough).42
Proposition 5 (1) In an equilibrium such that the H type invests when it is socially useful
(￿ = 1), let x 2 [0;1] denote the probability of investment by the L type.
(i) Ostracism (y = 1) occurs only when actions di⁄er, i.e. one agent invests and the other not.
(ii) Ostracism comes from the virtuous agent (a
j
0 = 1) when benchmarking is on the person and
from the unvirtuous one (ai
0 = 0) when benchmarking is on the situation.
(2) With both the AU/SE and SC speci￿cations and under either type of benchmarking, there
exists a (positive-measure) range of parameters such that both x = 1 and x = 0 are equilibria:
(i) When benchmarking is on the person, x = 1 is sustained by the ostracism of ￿sinners￿ (a
prosocial norm), while x = 0 involves no ostracism.
(ii) When benchmarking is on the situation, x = 0 is sustained by the ostracism of ￿do-gooders￿
(an antisocial norm), while x = 1 involves no ostracism.
The ￿rst result shows how a value of social conformity (strategic complementarity) arises
endogenously from individual concerns over self -image, as these give each agent an incentive to
exclude those who act di⁄erently from him. The second one captures the idea that discordant
actions are more threatening to a person￿ s self-concept, the more similar the individuals involved
are to him, either in their personal characteristics (religion, ethnicity, occupation, etc.) or in
the social environments they face (e.g., country and its level of development). Accordingly, the
harshest moral condemnations and punishments are reserved for deviant ￿insiders￿ .43
The second result also allows us to understand not only the standard ￿ndings that free-riders
in public-good games get punished (e.g., Fehr and G￿chter [2000]), but also the more puzzling
phenomenon of derogation, resentment and even punishment of those who exhibit stronger moral
principles or contribute ￿too much￿to public goods (e.g., Monin [2001] and other previously cited
references). The mechanism involved, moreover, is very much in line with Monin￿ s interpretation
of these behaviors as ego-defense mechanisms in response to threatening social comparisons in
the moral domain.
The proposition￿ s third result, ￿nally, sheds light on cross-society-di⁄erences in civic norms
and how they are enforced. Herrmann et al. [2008] ￿nd a signi￿cant positive (respectively,
negative) correlation across countries between the extent of social (respectively, antisocial) pun-
ishment by subjects in public-goods experiments, and national survey responses on both: (a)
citizens￿lack of tolerance for tax evasion, welfare fraud and other cheating behaviors; (b) their
trust in other people￿ s adherence to the rule of law and in local institutions￿enforcement of it.
42These two restrictions on the set of equilibria we consider are respectively ensured by conditions (C.22) and
(C.11) in Appendix A.
43For instance, the Catholic Church long imposed excommunication on apostates, and tortured and executed
heretics. The Sharia still prescribes that apostates should be put to death, lose their children and their property.
For an experimental study of the ￿black sheep e⁄ect￿ , see, e.g., Branscombe et al. (1993).
24V Further Applications
A Other dimensions of identity
Having so far focused on prosocial identity as the main example, we now relate the model￿ s
results to evidence on how other dimensions of people￿ s self-concept a⁄ect their behavior. As in
Section III.B, the di⁄erent paragraphs each correspond to a speci￿c result in Proposition 2 for
the positive ones, or Propositions 3-4 for the normative ones.
1) Salience of identity. Messages or cues that make speci￿c components of a person￿ s identity
more salient elicit investments along the same dimensions. LeBoeuf and Sha￿r [2010] thus ￿nd
that even minor manipulations emphasizing alternative aspects of subjects￿self-concept, such
as scholar versus socialite, or ethnic Chinese versus American citizen, trigger identity-consistent
expressions of consumption preferences. In experiments with monetary stakes, Benjamin et al.
[2010] similarly ￿nd that priming subjects to their ethnic identity causes Asian-Americans to
make more patient choices, Whites to makes choices that are both more patient and less risk
averse, and African-Americans to make more risk-averse ones.
A direct economic application of salience manipulation is advertising, much of which plays up
people￿ s desires to achieve or a¢ rm certain identities ￿ raising s with respect to beauty, wealth,
or social status. Proposition 3 shows that such messages can be very e⁄ective in inducing
consumers to purchase (a0 = 1) and yet substantially lower overall welfare.
2) Uncertain values and malleability of beliefs. People who, deep down, are insecure about
￿who they are￿(￿ in the middle range) are the most prone to costly identity-a¢ rming behaviors;
adolescents are perhaps the prime example. Individuals with stable self-knowledge, by contrast,
invest only if r0 is large enough to justify the cost. In line with this ￿uncertainty principle,￿
Adams et al. [1996] found that male subjects with strongly declared homophobia actually showed
the most arousal in response to male homoerotic videos (with no di⁄erence from others subjects
for heterosexual or female homoerotic materials).
3) Escalating commitment. The more identity-relevant capital they have, the more identity-
a¢ rming investment people will make, thereby raising the stock even further.44 Intuitively,
someone with more A0 has a greater vested interest in viewing this asset as valuable, and
further investment is the way to demonstrate such beliefs ￿ in accordance with the psychology
44This result is not due to any increasing returns in investment: in our model, r0 and c0 are independent of A0:
Instead, it re￿ ects the fact that people with more at stake have a higher demand for optimistic beliefs (implying
V23 > 0); an idea that has substantial empirical support. Pyszczinsky [1982] found that lottery participants rated
the prize as more desirable, the greater their perceived chance of winning it. Kay et al. [2002] found similar
outcomes among political partisans for electoral outcomes and among students for changes in tuition. In the
health domain, Kunda [1987] found that a purported scienti￿c article about the increased risk of breast cancer
from co⁄ee was judged less credible (among female but not male subjects) by co⁄ee-drinkers than by non-co⁄ee
drinkers. Best known is the ￿Stockholm syndrome￿ , in which hostages come to see their captors in a favorable
light, most plausibly so as to maintain hope that they will not harm them.
25literature on self-justi￿cation. A manager will thus keep throwing good money after bad on
a doomed project, as in the experiments of Staw [1976]. A farmer faced with adverse market
signals may obstinately refuse to quit rather than admit that his e⁄orts and sacri￿ces (or those of
his parents) have been in vain. Others will keep accumulating wealth, professional achievements,
political or religious activism, not so much for the marginal product of the later investments
but to preserve the perceived value of earlier ones ￿ that is, to safeguard the belief, true or false,
that these assets will bring happiness (or forestall misery) over the course of their lifetime, or a
favorable fate in some hereafter.
4) Responses to identity threats and boosts. Because equilibrium investment is (qualitatively)
hill-shaped in the strength of identity ￿ (see right panel of Figure II), manipulations of strong
and weak self-images in the same direction tend to have opposite e⁄ects.
(a) Threatening a strong identity triggers a ￿ghting response. In Maas et al. [2003], male
subjects who were told by the experimenters that their score on a personality test was so atypical
as to place them squarely in the female part of the distribution were subsequently much more
likely than the control group to harass a female (but not a male) chat-line user, by sending
her pornographic images. This e⁄ect was further accentuated when she (a confederate) had
previously described herself as a professionally ambitious feminist rather than a meek, family
oriented traditionalist. It was also more pronounced, the more the subjects had initially self-
rated themselves as masculine.
(b) Questioning a weak identity tends to induce con￿rmatory rather than opposing responses.
Consider, for instance, the debilitating impact of ￿stereotype threat￿on test performance (Steele
and Aronson [1995]). A stereotype of female or African-American students as having a lower
distribution of comparative mathematical abilities than their male or White and Asian counter-
parts means precisely that society places a lower probability on their being a high type (with vk
now representing ability rather than taste, or a combination of both). Making gender or race
subtly more salient before a test reminds these subjects of this widespread statistical perception
and thus (consciously or unconsciously) lowers their self-con￿dence. The equilibrium response
to this decrease in ￿ is (on average) to discourage academic-identity investment ￿ in this case,
e⁄ort and motivation to perform on the test.
B Extensions of the model
￿ Wishful thinking and procrastination: entrepreneurial versus precautionary behaviors. When
does the desire to indulge in hopeful thoughts and avoid frightening ones aggravate the self-
control problem, and when does it alleviate it? To answer this question, we combine the AU
and SC speci￿cations and allow for type-dependent returns r1(v) in investment. For an agent
26with self-view ^ ￿ 2 [0;1]; the marginal expected utility of investment at t = 1 is then
^ ￿vHr1(vH) + (1 ￿ ^ ￿)vLr1(vL): (20)
More optimistic beliefs enhance savoring of the existing stock (raising ^ vA1); but whether they
induce higher investment or ￿coasting￿hinges on whether z1(v) ￿ vr1(v) rises or falls with v;
bringing to light an important dichotomy between situations in which identity and e⁄ort are
complements or substitutes.45
(a) Wealth accumulation, status-seeking, and other entrepreneurial behaviors (complemen-
tarity). When z1(v) is increasing, wishful thinking (raising ^ ￿) alleviates the motivation problem,
if there is one; otherwise, it only results in excessive activism. This case occurs for instance if
r1 is type-independent (￿nancial assets), or if v corresponds to some ability that raises both the
probability of winning in a competitive situation and the expected value of the prize. Unrealis-
tic dreams of riches and glory ￿ and of how enjoyable those will be￿thus propel entrepreneurs,
explorers and athletes to sacri￿ces and persistence in the pursuit of long-term endeavors.
(b) Health investments, safe driving and other risk-prevention behaviors (substitutability).
In those cases z1(v) is decreasing. A favorable genetic endowment thus protects from disease
and makes taking care of one￿ s health less of a necessity; good driving skills and re￿ exes per-
mit driving at faster speeds. Wishful thinking ￿ understating the likelihood of illness, accident
or death￿then makes the present more enjoyable but further encourages negligent and risky
behaviors that are precisely those to which weakness of will already makes one too tempted to
succumb.
￿ Disappointment aversion. Beyond self-esteem and anticipatory utility, many other forms of
￿mental consumptions￿ (Schelling [1985]) can be incorporated into the model. For instance,
while anticipatory utility creates a demand for optimistic beliefs, the fear of being disappointed
when ￿nal outcomes are realized generates an opposing incentive to maintain low expectations
(￿defensive pessimism￿ ). This corresponds to a period-2 payo⁄ of the form D((v￿^ v)A1); where
D is increasing, concave and satis￿es auxiliary assumptions listed in Appendix B.
￿ Social signaling. In addition to their self-image ^ v; people also care about others￿perceptions
^ v0 of their type, resulting in a continuation value of the form V (v; ^ v;A1; ^ v0): Since others make
inferences from observed behavior, adding a social signaling concern is akin to amplifying the
self-image motive, so the entire analysis carries over (see again Appendix B).46
45See Appendix B for details, including the value function corresponding to (20).
46On social signaling see, e.g. Bernheim [1994] and BØnabou and Tirole [2006b].
27C Competing identities and dysfunctional behavior
We saw in Section II.B how the single-asset model can be interpreted as representing a tradeo⁄
between two identity dimensions, A and B; whose relative value is uncertain and which are
subject to resource or time rivalry at the investment stage. We analyze here a di⁄erent kind of
identity con￿ ict, consumption rivalry, and show it can lead to highly dysfunctional behaviors.
When time, geographical, legal or other exclusivity constraints (such as national or religious
a¢ liation) create a potential tradeo⁄ between reaping the future bene￿ts from two identities,
investing in one (say, B) inevitably damages the other (A); as it suggests that the individual may
not value it that much. If he has substantial capital vested in A but the ultimate value of this
identity is less ￿secure￿than that of B, he may then refrain from even highly desirable invest-
ments in B and end up worse o⁄as a result. We demonstrate this mechanism using anticipatory
utility or self-image, then discuss the more general case. We also make simplifying assumptions
under which A can be interpreted as the ￿traditional identity￿and B as the ￿modern￿one ￿ for
instance, in the context of farmers and workers faced with globalization and technical change,
or that of immigrants confronting the issue of integration.
(a) Modern identity. At t = 0; the agent decides whether to invest in B (b0 = 1), at a cost
cB; type-independent for simplicity: acquiring new skills, mastering a new language and culture,
socializing with an unfamiliar group, etc. The investment succeeds with probability ￿ 2 (0;1);
in which case B0 rises to B1 = B0 +b0rB; it fails with probability 1￿￿ (B1 = B0); for instance
because this is a new activity to which the agent may not be suited. The (per unit) value of B
capital, on the other hand, is a known vB. For instance, the monetary bene￿ts of successfully
integrating into the formal, majority-dominated labor market, of acquiring a degree or working
in the more dynamic sectors of the economy, are relatively easy to assess.
(b) Traditional identity. There is no possibility of investment in A at t = 0: Thus A0
corresponds either to a ￿xed trait (e.g., ethnicity) or to an asset that was accumulated in the
past but can no longer be signi￿cantly augmented: long-held skills, connections to ￿the old
country￿ , etc. Furthermore, the hedonic value of this stock is uncertain, since its bene￿ts are
of a more subjective and less quanti￿able nature than, say, those of a wage premium: strength
of personal values and commitments, long-run utility from family, morals, culture, religion, etc.
Thus vA equals vH or vL, with probabilities ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿:
The timing is the same as before. At date 0, the agent receives the signal vA; then chooses
b0 2 f0;1g. At date 1, he recalls vA with probability ￿ (^ vA = vA); and otherwise looks to his past
actions to form his sense of identity (^ vA = ^ v(b0)): At date 2, he is aware of vA (one could allow
for uncertainty here as well) and, assuming full rivalry, chooses optimally between consuming
either A or B, thus achieving maxfvAA2;vBB2g: To focus on the interesting case, suppose that:
28(a) ex post, the agent will consume B only if he had successfully invested in it,
vBB0 < vLA0 < vHA0 < vB (B0 + rB); (21)
so that A serves as a ￿fallback￿or insurance option;
(b) ex ante, the expected return from investing in B is su¢ ciently high that, when beliefs
are not malleable (the ￿objective￿case where ￿ = 1); such investment is optimal even for agents
who value A the most:
￿ (s + ￿)[vB (B0 + rB) ￿ vHA0] > cB: (22)
When self-perception concerns are operative, however, both types will fail to make this e¢ cient
investment, as long as
￿ (s + ￿)[vB (B0 + rB) ￿ vLA0] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)s(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v ￿ vL)A0 < cB: (23)
The ￿rst term is the standard economic return to investing, for an agent with relatively low
valuation for A: The second term represents the loss of identity that is incurred (by either type)
when doing so: with probability 1 ￿ ￿ such ￿betrayals￿will signify to the individual that he
does not care that much about A; and therefore has only grim prospects to look forward to in
case his investment in B does not work out.
On average, such a⁄ect-driven identity management ends up lowering personal welfare, as
in the single-identity case. While the value function is now nonlinear, making the analysis
more complicated, one can exploit the basic intuition that not investing in B is e⁄ectively like
investing in A; to show that all the preceding results apply here as well.
Proposition 6 Assume the anticipatory-utility (AU) speci￿cation, with (21)-(22).
1) The individual invests (weakly) less in a known identity (B) when it will compete in the future
with another one (A) of uncertain value.
2) This is more likely to happen the higher A0;1 ￿ ￿ and s; and it is always welfare reducing.
These results relate to some important social and economic issues.
1) Resistance to structural change. Trade and technical change alter the relative payo⁄s to
working in the modern, international sector and in traditional activities. The transition, which
is risky and requires new skills and lifestyles, will be resisted if it is seen as de-valuing the old
(rural, extended-family, blue-collar, etc.) identity, to which one might need to return one day.
2) Resistance to assimilation. Immigrants and their descendents experience strong tensions
between integrating into Western societies and preserving their speci￿c culture. This is par-
ticularly acute for the young, who are locally born and have citizenship but often do not feel
British, German or French. Yet neither do they feel Pakistani, Turkish or Algerian, having little
29knowledge of the ￿old country￿or its language. As seen earlier, it is in situations of uncertainty
over one￿ s own values that identity threats and investments become most relevant.47 Laws and
proposals such as the French ban on the veil or the Home Secretary￿ s [2001] urging that new-
comers adopt British ￿norms of acceptability￿ , take an oath of allegiance and embrace ￿our
laws, our values, our institutions￿then elicit signi￿cant opposition from those whose who feel
that complying would represent a betrayal of their own culture or religion.48 Conversely, native
populations feel that the values and traditions they ￿believe in￿ (religious, secular, political,
etc.) are undermined by visible displays of adherence to other cultures among newcomers, and
especially their locally-born descendants.
In a related vein, it has been suggested that low educational achievement among African-
Americans students may partly re￿ ect a desire to maintain an oppositional ethnic identity.
Austen-Smith and Fryer [2005] o⁄er a model of ￿acting White￿in which some minority students
forsake educational investment in order to signal loyalty to their peers. The idea there is a
di⁄erent one, namely that having demonstrably low labor market prospects makes one less
likely to leave when called upon to ￿give back to the community￿in the future.49
2) Destructive identity, discrimination and communitarianism. ￿Not investing in B￿ in
order to safeguard beliefs about the value of A can also mean actively destroying productive B
capital. This corresponds in the model to the case where cB < 0; so that the costly action is now
one that reduces B or prevents it from growing (b0 = 0): In the events that shook the suburbs
of French cities in 2005, for instance, the young rioters attacked and destroyed a number of
schools, nursery schools and cars in their own communities.
It is also interesting to note two factors that can ￿tip￿ the equilibrium from one in which
people optimally invest in B to one in which they self-defeatingly destroy those assets (i.e.,
a⁄ecting (23) while leaving (21) and (22) unchanged). The ￿rst is a lower perceived chance of
success in those investments (￿) or the associated payo⁄ (rB): Thus, if minority youth become
more pessimistic about their chances of mobility through education, or perceive that even with
diplomas the jobs to which they can aspire will be low-paying ones, they will switch to the
destructive-identity scenario, even when ￿ and rB remain high enough that investing in B
(education, integration) would still make them better o⁄ in the long run. A second potentially
47The results in Proposition 6 on the e⁄ects of A0 and ￿ are also consistent with the ￿ndings by Constant et
al. [2006] that, among immigrants to Germany, the probability of assimilation decreases with age at arrival and
with having had primary or secondary schooling in the country of origin.
48 See Hoge [2002]. Here again, self-perceived intentions matter: in￿ltrated members of an extremist organiza-
tion feel much less con￿ ict in submitting to such requirements, pledges, dress codes, etc., because they know that
their doing it really signals commitment to, rather than abandonment of, their chosen values.
49In our case, the (stochastic) returns to education are common knowledge and there is no incentive to deceive
others. Instead, the individual wants to sincerely believe, and thus tries to convince himself, that his community is
very valuable to him ￿ instead of his being valuable to them. Moreover, since this mechanism does not involve any
community enforcement of membership ￿payments￿through the expulsion of defectors, the relevant community
or identity capital can be far away, uncoordinated, or even virtual (e.g., native country, culture, religious faith).
30important factor is the salience s of the ￿alternative￿A identity and the bene￿ts anticipated
from it ￿ as with advertising in the single-identity case. This is where ideological or religious
indoctrination may come into play, as well as the ampli￿cation mechanism of media coverage.
While we have focused here on the anticipatory-utility or self-image case, which is somewhat
simpler and seems more appropriate to the applications just discussed, similar insights apply
when the demand for identity stems from a commitment problem. If the individual expects
su¢ cient temptation to underinvest in A relative to B at t = 1; he will not invest in B at
t = 0 even if it has a high return, and may even destroy B capital. Such a strategy serves
not as a physical commitment (investment costs and returns are independent of the stocks) but
as a cognitive one, aimed at de￿ning oneself as an A-person rather than a B-person. From
Proposition 4 we know that welfare may go up in this case, but need not.
VI Conclusion
We examined in this paper how moral identity shapes individual and collective behavior. More
generally, we developed a simple, ￿ exible framework for analyzing a broad class of economically
important beliefs which people value and invest in. The model also o⁄ers a uni￿ed account of
many seemingly disparate or contradictory ￿ndings by psychologists and experimental econo-
mists. Others, such as endowment e⁄ects, could easily be obtained (see Gottlieb [2008]).
Rather than restate here the paper￿ s results, we will single out two interesting avenues for
further research which they point to. The ￿rst one is that of sacred values and taboos, where
our framework o⁄ers a way of bringing the debate over markets and morals into the realm of
formal analysis. The second one concerns the role, in bargaining and other distributive con￿ icts,
of self-serving beliefs linked to pride and dignity concerns. In BØnabou and Tirole [2009], these
are shown to reduce the range of sustainable sharing agreements and, beyond a point, inevitably
cause a bargaining impasse in spite of fully symmetric information. Many interesting questions
remain to explore along this line, such as the optimal design of contracts and organizations or
the political economy of reforms when agents have motivated beliefs.
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If V12 = 0 (as with anticipatory utility) then ￿ > 0; so any equilibrium must have xL (1 ￿ xH) =
0: When V12 > 0 the same holds provided ^ v(1) ￿ ^ v(0); but since those beliefs are endogenous
we must make monotonicity a requirement. The possible equilibrium con￿gurations are then:
(a) No investment: xH = xL = 0, hence ^ v(0) = ￿ v and ^ v(1) = vH; with
V(vH;v;A0) ￿ V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 : (A.2)
(b) Randomization by vH : 1 > xH > xL = 0, hence ^ v(1) = vH and vL < ^ v(0) < v; with
V(vH; ^ v (0);A0) = V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 :
(c) Separation: 1 = xH > xL = 0, hence ^ v(1) = vH and ^ v(0) = vL; with
V(vH;vL;A0) ￿ V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 ; (A.3)
V(vL;vL;A0) ￿ V(vL;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cL
0: (A.4)
(d) Mixing by vL: 1 = xH > xL > 0, hence ^ v(0) = vL and v < ^ v (1) < vH; with
V(vL;vL;A0) = V(vL; ^ v (1);A0 + r0) ￿ cL
0: (A.5)
(e) Full investment xH = xL = 1, hence ^ v(0) = vL and ^ v (1) = v; with
V(vL;vL;A0) ￿ V(vL;v;A0 + r0) ￿ cL
0: (A.6)
We can ￿rst rule out equilibria of type (b), in which type H randomizes: since V2 > 0;
the no-investment equilibrium also exists if an equilibrium of type (b) exists. Furthermore,
since V (v; ￿ v;A0) > V (v; ^ v (0);A0) for all v; both types are better o⁄ in the no-investment
equilibrium, so we can apply the Pareto criterion in order to select the policy equilibrium. For
the same reason, we can rule out the separating equilibrium (type (c)) whenever it coexists with
the no-investment equilibrium (type (a)).
We now show that there exists a unique equilibrium, which involves no investment when
(A.2) holds and, when this condition fails, separation, randomization by vL or full investment,
depending respectively on whether (A.3)-(A.4), (A.5) or (A.6) holds.
321) If V(vH;vL;A0) ￿ V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 ; it is a dominant strategy for both types not
to invest, so xH = xL = 0 for all ￿, or equivalently ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:
2) Assume now that V(vH;vL;A0) < V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 : Because ￿ v ’ vL for ￿ small,
the no-investment regime (a) cannot prevail for ￿ small. More generally, it obtains whenever
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, where ￿ ￿ > 0 is de￿ned by
V(vH; ￿ ￿vH + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)vL;A0) ￿ V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cH
0 (A.7)
if this equation has a solution in (0;1) and to 1 otherwise. For ￿ < ￿ ￿ we have xH = 1 from the
previous taxonomy and the Pareto-dominance assumption.
If (A.4) holds, the equilibrium is separating: xH = 1 and xL = 0. By contrast, if
V(vL;vL;A0) < V(vL;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ cL
0, the L type must invest with positive probability.
If (A.6) holds there can be no solution to (A.5) with xL < 1; so the only equilibrium is full
investment on [0; ￿ ￿): If (A.6) is reversed, on the other hand, it involves mixing: by (10),
^ v(1) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)xL
vH +
(1 ￿ ￿)xL
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)xL
vL; (A.8)
and by (A.5) this expression must be independent of ￿: Thus, xL = (￿ ￿ 1)=(1=￿ ￿ 1), where
￿ = 1=^ ￿(1) > 1 is also a constant. If (￿ ￿ 1)=(1=￿ ￿ ￿ 1) < 1, then the L type mixes over all of
[0; ￿ ￿]; if (￿ ￿ 1)=(1=￿ ￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1; de￿ne ~ ￿ by (￿ ￿ 1)~ ￿=(1 ￿ ~ ￿) ￿ 1 or, equivalently,
V(vL;vL;A0) = V(vL; ~ ￿vH + (1 ￿ ~ ￿)vL);A0 + r0) ￿ cL
0; (A.9)
implying ~ ￿ > 0 by Assumption 4. Then xL 2 (0;1) for 0 < ￿ < ~ ￿ and xL = 1 for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿: ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. (1)(i) When ￿ decreases, each type￿ s incentive to invest, V(v; ^ v(1);
A0 + r0) ￿ V(v; ^ v(0);A0) increases: by (11), its derivative with respect to 1 ￿ ￿ is
V (v; ^ v(1);A0 + r0) ￿ V (v;v;A0 + r0) + V (v;v;A0) ￿ V (v; ^ v(0);A0)
which exceeds
R ^ v(1)
^ v(0) V2(v;x;A0)dx > 0 if either v = vL (by the assumption V23 ￿ 0); or if v = vH
and ^ v(1) = vH: Since the full-investment region (e) and the mixing region (d) are both governed
by type L￿ s incentives, the ￿rst case implies that as 1 ￿ ￿ increases region (e) expands and xL
decreases in region (d). The second case implies that the no-investment region (a) shrinks.
(ii) It is easily veri￿ed from (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) that a decrease in cH
0 increases ￿ ￿ while
a decrease in cL
0 decreases ~ ￿ and reduces ^ v(1) in the mixing region, thus increasing xL: Thus,
again investment unambiguously increases.
(iii) and (iv). In the AU case,
V(v; ^ v(1);A0 + r0) ￿ V(v; ^ v(0);A0) = s[￿vr0 + (1 ￿ ￿)[^ v(1)(A0 + r0) ￿ ^ v(0)A0] + ￿vr0
33rises with s and A0. The rest of the proof follows the steps of part (i).
(2) The result is obvious when xL(~ ￿) = 0 (separating equilibrium), since xL(￿) ￿ 0 in that
case. When xL(~ ￿) > 0 (equilibrium with randomization), it follows from the fact that b v (1) and
therefore ^ ￿(1) = ￿=[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)xL(￿)] must remain constant over [0; ~ ￿]: ￿
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider (13). If (s + ￿)vLr0 ￿ cL
0; it is a dominant strategy for
both types to invest, so xH = xL = 1 and changes in ￿ do not a⁄ect behavior, nor W: If
(s + ￿)vLr0 < cL
0 and (s + ￿)vHr0 < cH
0 ; then cH
0 > cL
0 > 0 so W decreases with both xH and
xL; a decrease in ￿ can therefore only (weakly) lower welfare. Finally, when (s + ￿)vHr0￿cH
0 ￿
0 > (s + ￿)vLr0 ￿ cL
0, type H always invests (xH = 1); hence ￿ can only a⁄ect xL, and any
increase in xL reduces welfare since cL
0 > 0: The proof for small changes in A0 around the no-
investment threshold (given by (14)) is similar, since the direct e⁄ect on the last term in (13) is
in￿nitesimal, whereas the jump in xH (and possibly xL) is discrete. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4 We construct an appropriate mixed equilibrium. Choose c￿
1 2 (0;1)
such that ￿￿r1￿ v < c￿
1 < ￿￿r1vH: Next, de￿ne v￿ 2 (￿ v;vH) as v￿ ￿ c￿
1=￿￿r1 and xL 2 (0;1) by
^ ￿(1) ￿
￿





Suppose now that F(c1) puts mass 1 on c￿
1; by continuity, the arguments below will continue
to hold when the mass is close enough to 1: By construction, the agent invests at t = 1 when
^ v ￿ v￿: As to (A.10), it means that if the L type mixes at t = 0 with probability xL; the
posterior following a0 = 1 is exactly v￿, inducing a1 = 1 for both types. Next, choose cH
0 and
cL
0 such that mixing with probability xL de￿ned by (A.10) is indeed the equilibrium:
cH
0 < ￿r0vH + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿r1vH ￿ c￿
1) = V(vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ V(vH; ￿ v;A0); (A.11)
cL
0 ￿ ￿r0vL + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿r1vL ￿ c￿
1) = V(vL;v￿;A0 + r0) ￿ V(vL;vL;A0): (A.12)
Compared to the equilibrium that prevails when ￿ = 1; in which ^ v = v always, this yields a gain
in E[V ] given by (16) and a loss term equal to zero; hence a positive contribution to welfare.
Turning now to period 0; in order for the equilibrium with ￿ = 1 to be one where neither
type invests in spite of the fact that choosing a0 = 1 would be be ex ante e¢ cient for both
(making the ￿rst two terms in (15) positive), if su¢ ces that
￿cL
0 < ￿vLr0 < ￿vHr0 < cH
0 : (A.13)
Compatibility with (A.11)-(A.12) requires that (1￿￿)(￿r1vH ￿ c￿
1) > 0 and (1￿￿)(￿r1vL ￿ c￿
1) <
(1=￿ ￿ 1)￿vLr0; neither of which contradicts any other condition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5 Since this proof is fairly long, we provide it in online Appendix C. ￿
34Appendix B: Extensions and Variants of the Model
￿ Disappointment aversion. Let S(v; ^ v;A1) ￿ D((v￿^ v)A1) be part of the agent￿ s date-2 payo⁄,
where D0 > 0 ￿ D and ￿xD00(x)=D0(x) < 1 for all x: Concavity, which means that negative
surprises weigh more than positive ones, implies S12 > 0; while the elasticity condition ensures
that S13 > 0 nonetheless. Thus, adding this term into the continuation value V only reinforces
the sorting condition in Assumption 2, while generating a demand for ￿defensive pessimism￿ .
For V2 to remain positive, this last e⁄ect must not be too strong relative to that generated by
s1: Alternatively, it could be so strong as to make V2 negative everywhere; all that is needed is
that s1v + ￿D((^ v ￿ v)A1) be monotonic in v over all feasible values of v; ^ v and A1:
￿ Anticipatory utility and procrastination Let z1(v) ￿ vr1(v) for all v: Consider now an agent
with self-view de￿ned by ^ v 2 [vL;vH]; or equivalently ^ ￿ ￿ (^ v ￿ vL)=(vH ￿ vL) 2 [0;1]: Denoting
^ z1 ￿ ^ ￿z1(vH) + (1 ￿ ^ ￿)z1(vL); the agent invests at t = 1 if ￿ (s + ￿) ^ z1 ￿ c1; leading to
V (v; ^ v;A1) ￿ (s^ v + ￿v)A1 +
Z ￿(s+￿)^ z1
0
[(s + ￿)z1(v) ￿ c1] dF (c1): (B.1)
Since @^ z1=@^ v = [z1(vH) ￿ z1(vL)]=(vH ￿ vL); this function satis￿es V13 > 0; V23 > 0 if s > 0
and V12 > 0 as long as z1(v) is strictly monotonic in v; in either direction. In the case where
z1(v) is decreasing, one just needs to impose conditions such that V2 remains positive (over the
relevant range).
￿ Resource rivalry. Taking for simplicity an extreme case of the investment rivalry described in
Section II.B, suppose that: (a) the agent can invest in either A or B (at = 1￿bt 2 f0;1g); with
respective returns rAt;rBt; salience sA;sB; and similar notation for other parameters; (b) his
long-term values are subject to a relative preference shock: vA = ￿ vA + v=2 and vB = ￿ vB ￿ v=2;
where v = " > 0 with probability ￿ and v = ￿" with probability 1 ￿ ￿: The model is then
essentially isomorphic to the basic one, with all variables rede￿ned as di⁄erentials. The relevant
asset is now the row vector A0 ￿ (A ￿ B); so that ￿a higher stock￿means a higher A; a lower
B or both (with enough parameter symmetry, only the scalar A￿B matters, but that need not
generally be the case) and similarly for r0 ￿ (rAt ￿ rBt); s0 ￿ (sAt ￿ sBt); etc.
￿ Social signaling. The expected value function playing the role of (11) is now
V(v; ^ v;A1) ￿ ￿V (v;v;A1; ^ v) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (v; ^ v;A1; ^ v):
Thus, as long as (v; ^ v;A1) 7￿! V (v; ^ v;A1; ^ v) satis￿es Assumption 3, adding a social signaling
concern is akin to amplifying the self-signaling motive (from (1 ￿ ￿)V2 to (1 ￿ ￿)V2 + V4), and
the whole analysis, positive and normative, carries over.
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40Online Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 5 (1) Since we focus on equilibria in which there is no investment when
￿ ￿ 0; while the H type always invests when ￿ = 1; observing a peer who invests is necessarily
good news about one￿ s v (benchmarking on the person) and / or about the usefulness of the
task, ￿: In particular, if aj = aj = 1; then necessarily ￿ = 1: Excluding one￿ s peer would then
entail not only the direct cost of ostracism but also, if individual values are correlated, bad
news about one￿ s own v: Thus, ruling out weakly dominated strategies, as we assumed, no one
chooses to ostracize. Similarly, if ai = aj = 0; staying with one￿ s peer economizes on the cost
of ostracism but also serves as a signal that ￿ ￿ 0; providing reassuring news about one￿ s own
valuation. In conclusion, ostracism can occur only when actions di⁄er.
(2) From there on, we focus on subgames in which the two agents￿actions di⁄er, with aj = 1
and ai = 0:
(a) Benchmarking on the person. Note ￿rst that ostracism is a weakly dominated strategy
for the agent who fails to invest: since own actions are always recalled, having chosen ai
0 = 0
unambiguously identi￿es him as an L type. For his partner, however, having chosen a
j
0 = 1 is
an imperfect signal (due to partial pooling by L￿ s), so the deviation by i represents damaging
news, given the (perfect) correlation between vi and vj:
The ￿rst equilibrium condition is that agent j chooses to ostracize agent i: Viewed from the
point of view of j, a separation is exogenous with probability ￿ and endogenous with probability
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x(1 ￿ x) (the probability that there is no exogenous split, that v1 = v2 = vL and
that a
j
0 = 1 and ai




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x
vH +
(1 ￿ ￿)x
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x
vL; (C.1)
while it is vL conditional on the separation being endogenous (due to his excluding i for ai = 0).
Let
b b v(x) ￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x(1 ￿ x)
b v(x) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x(1 ￿ x)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x(1 ￿ x)
vL: (C.2)
be the resulting expected value of v for a separation of unknown origin. Because V12 ￿ 0, the




V (vL , b b v(x), A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0 + r0)
i
￿ b: (C.3)
The second equilibrium condition relates to investment. Since values are perfectly correlated, an
individual with type L knows that his partner will be of the same type, and thus invest with
probability x: The individual thus invests if:
0 ￿ ￿cL
0 + ￿[V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL, A0) + (1 ￿ ￿)xb]
1+ (1 ￿ ￿)
n
￿[V (vL , b b v(x), A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)[V (vL , b b v(x), A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0) ￿ b]
+ (1 ￿ ￿)x[V (vL ,
o









￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x2vH +
(1 ￿ ￿)x2
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x2vL ￿ b b v(x); (C.5)
with strict inequality for x > 0:
We look for conditions under which x = 0 (with no ostracism, yi = yj = 0) and x = 1 (with




are both equilibrium strategies for type L:
It will be useful to denote, for all ￿;
K￿ ￿ cL
0 ￿ ￿[V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL;A0)]; (C.6)
and note that K￿ ￿ K1 > 0 by Assumption 4.
Substituting
o
v(0) = b b v(0) = vH into conditions (C.3)-(C.4), x = 0 is an equilibrium if and
only if
b ￿ ￿H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL,vH,A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL, A0)] ￿ K￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)b: (C.7)
Similarly, using the fact that
o
v(1) > b b v(1) = v in conditions (C.3)-(C.4), su¢ cient conditions for
x = 1 to be an equilibrium are given by
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL; ￿ v;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL, A0)] ￿ maxfb; K￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)bg: (C.8)
Since ￿H > ￿ ￿; these conditions hold simultaneously if and only if
min
￿
(￿H ￿ K￿)=(1 ￿ ￿); K￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿: (C.9)
This de￿nes a nonempty range for b if
￿H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ < K￿ < (2 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿; (C.10)
For ￿ close to 1; the prior ￿ v is close to vH; so ￿ ￿ is close to ￿H and (C.10) therefore de￿nes
a nonempty range in R+ for K￿; or equivalently for cL
0. Consequently, there exists a positive-
measure range of parameters for which equations (C.7)-(C.8) hold jointly. Finally, to ensure that
a0 = 1 is a dominant strategy for the H type, it su¢ ces that cH
0 be small enough (relative to
2vH and b). This concludes the proof that both equilibria coexist over a positive-measure range
of parameters.
(b) Benchmarking on the situation. Consider ￿rst the event when investment is socially
harmful or useless (￿ ￿ 0): The following assumption ensures that it is an equilibrium for no




Assumption 5 For k 2 fH;Lg;
~ ck
0 ￿ ￿b + ￿[V (vk , vk , A0 + ￿r0) ￿ V (vk , vk , A0)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vk , vk , A0 + ￿r0) ￿ V (vk , vL , A0)] (C.11)
There are two simple conditions under which this will hold. First, provided V is unbounded
(as in our AU and SC speci￿cations), one can ￿nd a ￿￿ < 0 that makes the right-hand side small
enough, for all ￿ ￿ ￿￿: This is not necessarily very plausible, however, as it may require that
investment create great harm to society and the individual￿ s relational capital. Alternatively,
we can observe that the right hand-side of (C.11) is increasing in ￿ and the term multiplying
1 ￿ ￿ increasing in vk ; since the costs now are ~ cH
0 ￿ ~ cL
0; a su¢ cient condition is that
~ cL
0 ￿ ￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vH , vH , A0) ￿ V (vH , vL , A0)]: (C.12)
We now turn to agents￿strategies in the more interesting event where ￿ = 1: We ￿rst take
as given that the vH always invests (xH = 1) in that case, and focus on the behavior of the L
type. We then check that xH = 1 is indeed a best response by the H type.
The key idea is that since agents do not recall the realization of ￿; the possibility of the event
￿ ￿ 0 supplies a potential excuse for not investing. This excuse can only work, however, if the
other agent is also not investing. Indeed, if ai
0 = 0 while a
j
0 = 1, the presence of the virtuous
agent j deprives agent i of an excuse. Agent i then ostracizes agent j if and only if
(1 ￿ ￿)
h
V (vL , b b v(x), A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)
i
￿ b (C.13)
where b b v(x) now denotes i￿ s self image following ai
0 = 0 and a subsequent separation. To compute
this posterior, consider the following two events. With probability 1￿￿; ￿ = 0 so no one invests
and separation occurs only exogenously, with probability ￿: In this case nothing is learned about
agents￿types, so the posterior remains at the prior, ￿ v: With probability ￿; ￿ = 1; in which case
a
j
0 = 0 occurs with probability (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x) and separation occurs if there is an exogenous
breakdown or if the other agent, having chosen a
j
0 = 1; excludes agent i: When ￿ = 1, the
probability that ai = 0 and a separation occurs is therefore
￿(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x)]: (C.14)
3Consequently, agent i￿ s self-image following ai
0 = 0 and a separation is given by
b b v(x) =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿(x)
￿ v +
￿￿(x)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿(x)
vL: (C.15)
Consider next the investment decision of type L when ￿ = 1. The decision hinges on
￿ cL
0 + ￿V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (vL;b v(x), A0 + r0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x]b
? ￿[V (vL;vL;A0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)b] + (1 ￿ ￿)f[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)x]V (vL , b b v(x), A0)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)[￿V (vL , b b v(x), A0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL ,
o
v(x), A0) + b]]g; (C.16)
where b v(x) is still given by (C.1) while the beliefs following ai
0 = a
j




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ x)2￿ v +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ x)2
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ x)2vL: (C.17)
We now look for conditions under which x = 1 and x = 0 are both equilibria, sustained respec-
tively by L types ostracizing any partner who invests, and by no ostracism.
For x = 1; b b v(1) =
o
v(1) = b v(1) = v; so by (C.13) and (C.16) x = 1 is an equilibrium if and
only if
b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL , ￿ v, A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)]; (C.18)
0 ￿ ￿cL
0 + ￿[V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL;A0)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL;v;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;v;A0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)b: (C.19)
For x = 0; (C.13) becomes
(1 ￿ ￿)
h
V (vL , b b v(0), A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)
i
￿ b; (C.20)
which implies (C.18), since b b v(0) < ￿ v by (C.15). As to (C.16), since ^ v(0) = vH it takes the form
(1 ￿ ￿)
n
V (vL;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ ￿V (vL;b b v(0);A0)





0 ￿ ￿[V (vL;vL;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;vL;A0)] ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)b
= K￿ ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)b: (C.21)
To summarize, both equilibria will coexist if (C.19) to (C.21) hold, together with (C.12), which
ensures that no one invests when ￿ = 0; plus a condition stating that when ￿ = 1 the H type
always ￿nds it optimal to invest. This last requirement is automatically satis￿ed in the candidate
4equilibrium where x = 1, since even the L type wants to invest. For x = 0; the H type must want
to invest even though this will get him ostracized if his partner is an L type; by not investing,
on the other hand, his action would identify him as such a type. The last condition is thus
cH
0 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)b < ￿[V (vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vH;vH;A0)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vH;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vH;vL;A0)]: (C.22)
We now show that these ￿ve conditions are compatible over a nonempty range of parameters.
For ￿ close to 0; ￿ v; b b v(x) and
o
v(x) are all close to ￿ v for all x; so (C.12), (C.20), (C.19) and (C.21)
will respectively hold if
~ cL
0 + b > (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vH , vH , A0) ￿ V (vH , vL , A0)]; (C.23)
b < (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL , ￿ v, A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)]; (C.24)
K￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b < (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL;v;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL;v;A0)]; (C.25)
K￿ ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)b > (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL;vH;A0 + r0) ￿ V (vL; ￿ v;A0)] (C.26)
Next, taking limits as r0 and ￿ tend to 0, these four inequalities will hold for r0 and ￿ small
enough if
~ cL
0 + b > (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vH , vH , A0) ￿ V (vH , vL , A0)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)P (C.27)
b < (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL , ￿ v, A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Q(￿); (C.28)
cL
0 < b; (C.29)
cL
0 ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)b > (1 ￿ ￿)[V (vL;vH;A0) ￿ V (vL; ￿ v;A0)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)R(￿) (C.30)
Let " and ￿ be small positive numbers, and de￿ne
b ￿ (1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿)Q(1); (C.31)
cL
0 ￿ ~ cL
0 = [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]b: (C.32)
Condition (C.28) will hold provided " is small enough, while (C.29) holds for all ￿ > 0; as long
as ￿ < 1: As to (C.27) and (C.30), they become:
(1 ￿ ")[2 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)]Q(1) > P; (C.33)




One can ￿nd " and ￿ small enough such that (C.33) holds for all ￿ close enough to 1; provided
2Q(1) > P; that is
52[V (vL , vH, A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)] > V (vH , vH , A0) ￿ V (vH , vL , A0): (C.35)
In the AU/SE case, V (v , ^ v, A) ￿ (s^ v + ￿v)A; so the condition clearly holds. In the SC case,
V (v , ^ v, A) ￿ ￿vA +
R ￿￿^ vr1
0 (￿vr1 ￿ c1) dF(c1); so it holds if and only if
Z ￿￿vHr1
￿￿vLr1
[￿r1 (2vL ￿ vH) ￿ c1] dF(c1) > 0; (C.36)
for which it su¢ ces that ￿r1 (2vL ￿ vH) > ￿￿vHr1; or vL=vH > (1+￿)=2: This condition can be
imposed as long as ￿ < 1; and it then automatically implies (6).
Turning next to (C.34) and noting that R(1) = 0; one can ￿nd " and ￿ small enough such
that (C.34) holds for all ￿ close enough to 1; provided 2Q(1) > R0(1); or
2[V (vL , vH, A0) ￿ V (vL , vL , A0)] > V2(vL;vH;A0)(vH ￿ vL): (C.37)
A su¢ cient condition (much stronger than necessary) is that V (v , ^ v, A) be weakly concave in
^ v: In the AU/SE case, V is linear. In the SC case, we have
V2(v; ^ v;A) = (v ￿ ￿^ v) f(￿￿^ vr1) ￿(￿r1)2 : (C.38)
Since vL > ￿vH by (6), the ￿rst term is always positive, so a su¢ cient condition for concavity
is that f be nonincreasing on its support.
The last condition to check is (C.22). Given (C.31), it will hold for r0 and ￿ close to 0 if
cH
0 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿)Q(1) < (1 ￿ ￿)P: (C.39)
Letting 0 < cH
0 < (1 ￿ ￿)P ensures that this inequality is satis￿ed for all ￿ close enough to 1:
This concludes the proof that conditions (C.12) and (C.19) to (C.22) are mutually consistent
over a positive-measure set of parameters, ensuring the claimed multiplicity of equilibria. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6 Given (21) and (22), the intertemporal utility of an agent with value
vA 2 fvH;vLg who starts with stocks (A0;B0) and chooses b0 2 f0;1g is:
~ W(vA;A0;B0;b0) ￿ b0￿ (￿ + s)vB (B0 + rB)
+ (1 ￿ b0)[￿vA + s(￿v + (1 ￿ ￿)^ vA(1 ￿ b0))]A0
+ b0(1 ￿ ￿)[￿vA + s(￿v + (1 ￿ ￿)^ vA(b0))]A0 ￿ b0cB: (C.40)
Let us now de￿ne a0 ￿ 1 ￿ b0; R0 ￿ ￿A0; c0 ￿ cB ￿ ￿ (￿ + s)vB (B0 + rB); common to both
types, and the functions:
V (v; ^ v;A1) ￿ c0 + (￿vA + s^ vA)A1; (C.41)
6V(v; ^ v;A1) ￿ ￿V (v;v;A1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (v; ^ v;A1):
It is then easy to see that (C.40) can be rewritten as
W(vA;A0;B0;a0) = ￿c0a0 + V(vA; ^ vA(a0);A0(1 ￿ ￿) + a0R0) (C.42)
and that V is the same as in (4) apart from a constant, so it satis￿es Assumption 3. Thus,
although c0 and V no longer individually correspond to the date-zero costs and date-1 expected
value function (e.g., c0 includes payo⁄s received at dates 1 and 2); their sum still de￿nes the
agent￿ s objective function, with the only change with respect to the one dimensional problem
being a minor one in the ￿￿ctitious￿law of motion for At, which is now A1 = A0(1￿￿)+a0R0:
The depreciation￿term in 1￿￿ will not change anything (qualitatively), while the fact that the
return R0 = ￿A0 now increases with the initial stock will only reinforce the fact that investment
increases with A0: The agent therefore invests at t = 0 if and only if
V(vA; ^ v(1);A0(1 ￿ ￿) + R0) ￿ V(vA; ^ v(0);A0(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ c0 (C.43)
and all results in Propositions 1 and 2 applicable to the anticipatory-utility case remain un-
changed. In particular, equilibrium generally results in excessive ￿investment￿ in A; which
mean suboptimally low investments in B: ￿
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